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I. Diversity in Legal Scholarship: The Debate
In recent years a number of legal scholars have argued that the
work of minority scholars and teachers' should be encouraged and
expected to play a special role in the process of defining and
shaping legal issues that particularly affect minority communities in
the United States.' They have asserted that minority scholars
possess special insights about how the law affects and has affected
members of minority communities, and that it is therefore impor-
tant for minority scholars to comprise a significant proportion of
the participants in debates about legal issues that particularly affect
minorities. They also assert that, compared to the proportion of
minorities in the general population and in the legal community in
general, minority scholars are underrepresented on legal faculties.
In addition, some legal scholars claim that the work of minority
§cholars is not published or cited with the frequency of the work of
majority legal scholars, even on topics that are of greater impor-
tance to the minority community, such as civil rights law. They call
for more minority scholars to be hired, published, read, and cited.
1. The focus of the immediate debate and of this paper is on law school faculty and
legal scholarship. Faculty members do comprise a substantial, perhaps major, portion of the
scholars who are concerned with how our legal system operates and how it should be
reformed. They are also responsible for teaching the next several generations of lawyers
how to use that legal system and the values the system embodies. However, the discussion
in this paper is relevant and must be applied to all lawyers who play a role in the process of
formulating and reforming legal doctrine: judges, government regulators, legislators, and
lawyers who argue before courts or try to influence legislation either on behalf of clients or
according to their own ideas of what the law should be.
2. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unspoken Limit of Affirmative Action: The Chronicle
of the DeVine Gift, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 140 (1987); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price
of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4, n.2 (1979); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Water
Buffalo and Diversity: Naming Names and Reclaiming the Racial Discourse, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 209, 216-17 (1993); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship:
Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39; Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 566-73
(1984); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up
Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1-2 (1988); Mark Tushnet, Spite Fences and Scholars:
Why Race Is and Is Not Different, 26 CONN. L. REV. 285, 288-93 (1993); see also Kemberle
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 1-12 (1989); Christopher Edley, Jr., The Boycott at Harvard: Should
Teaching Be Colorblind?, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1982, at A23. See generally, Duncan
Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 705.
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To achieve these goals, they call for a legal scholar's minority status
to be counted as a positive qualification for participation in the
academic legal community. Overall, these scholars claim that the
work of minority legal scholars should be presumed to provide a
"minority perspective" different from the work of dominant
community scholars.
In Racial Critiques of Legal Academia,3 Professor Randall
Kennedy has responded that the use of race as a qualification,
albeit a positive one, should be avoided because its use in the past
as a way of selecting people for jobs or of validating social classi-
fications has always proved to have invidious effects.4 Professor
Kennedy agrees that the experiences and viewpoints of the
minority community should influence the development of legal
scholarship in areas such as civil rights but asserts that the real
issue has always been and remains the intellectual merit of the
proffered scholarship, because an author's race or skin color cannot
tell us whether his or her work has intellectual merit.5 Thes
assertions are correct as far as they go; they simply do not go far
enough.
By speaking in favor of intellectual merit, Professor Kennedy
is taking a path traditionally espoused by the dominant community,
which appears to have contributed to the antagonism his article has
generated among critical race scholars.6 However, he clearly
rejects at least some practices that traditionally have been used as
measures of intellectual merit. Professor Kennedy points out, for
example, that citations to an article that are designed to reward
friends or colleagues, advance one's own career or increase the
3. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989). Professor Kennedy's main focus is showing how Professors Bell, Delgado and
Matsuda, supra note 2, have not adequately tested or persuasively presented their claims that
white prejudice is primarily responsible for the relative exclusion of minority scholars and
their work from elite law schools and mainstream legal discourse, and arguing that
intellectual merit is preferable to racial origin as a way to assess scholars and their ideas. Id.
4. Id. at 1786-87.
5. Id. passim, but especially, at 1772 n.114, 1805.
6. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872 (1990);
Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV.
95 (1990); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1878 (1990). For other criticisms of Kennedy, see also Milner S. Ball, The
Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1855 (1990); Robin D. Barnes,
Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race
Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990); Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in
the Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990).
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reputation or prestige of one's school are all nonmeritocratic,
however common in practice, and that the resulting citations cannot
be relied on as an indication that the works cited actually have
intellectual merit.7
Based on this rejection of such traditional practices, as well as
the general tenor of Professor Kennedy's article and the care with
which he cites and characterizes his opponents, I believe that his
arguments express a good faith concern for merit in its best sense.
Expressed in traditional terms, it is the valid concern that legal
scholarship be recognized and scholars
rewarded for furthering the search for "truth," for helping the
scholarly community and society better understand "reality." Every
scholarly discipline is
an intellectual activity ... reflecting as well as molding the
modern understanding of reality.... Every scholar or scientist
who deals with a subject matter from the past does so in terms
of his present grasp of reality and the results of his research in
turn flow into the current body of knowledge from which the
continual modification of our understanding of reality
emerges.8
However, as recognized both by the critical race scholars whom
Professor Kennedy is addressing and by a much larger number of
feminist scholars, this only opens further, rather than closes, the
issue of how intellectual merit is to be recognized.
Philosophers have long probed the difficulties of knowing
what we know and what we do not know and of separating objec-
tive reality from our subjective examination of the world.9 But
7. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1807.
8. JAMES M. ROBINSON & HELMUT KOESTER, TRAJECTORIES THROUGH EARLY
CHRISTIANITY (1971), quoted in ELISABETH SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, IN MEMORY OF HER:
A FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CHRISTIAN ORIGINS xvii (1983); see also,
e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist
Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 26 (1990) (scholarship should address questions of
knowledge, i.e., how we construct truth); Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship
and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 967-68 (1981).
9. See, e.g., MARTIN J. WALSH, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 307-308 (1985) (Hume
taught: "The bounds of experience... are also the bounds of all knowledge"); id. at 316-17
(Kant believed that human understanding is incapable of knowing things as they are in
themselves, and that knowledge is a synthetic, relational product of the activity of the senses
or the ego); GEORGE L. ABERNATHY & THOMAS A. LANGFORD, INTRODUCTION TO
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 273 (1970) (to Schelling consciousness is the only object of which we
have immediate knowledge); id. at 295 (Schopenhauer distinguished between the phenomenal
world, the world a3 experienced and rationally understood, and the nominal world, the world
[Vol. 100:4
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only recently have feminist philosophers and scholars in other fields
begun to illuminate some of the additional factors, previously
ignored or taken for granted, that affect each person's subjective
examination of the world, thereby changing the perception of
"objective reality."1
The factor most explored by feminists is the gender of the
subject, the examiner of the world. Feminists have claimed, and
have persuaded numerous other scholars and students across many
disciplines, that experiencing the world as members of one sex
frequently leads to ways of seeing the world different from those
experienced by the other sex." These different ways of seeing
and understanding, what feminists call different "perspectives" of
the world, create what amount to different realities for the two
sexes. The perceptions of most men appear to reflect one
"objective reality." The different set of perceptions of most
women, arising from different experiences, appear to reflect a
different "objective reality."12 In effect, feminists claim that our
different gender perspectives actually create different realities for
women and men, realities that only appear "objective" to their
beholders. 3
as it stands independently of the knower's effort to apprehend it).
10. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 14, 57-73 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988). See generally, IAN G. BARBOUR, MYTH MODELS, AND PARADIGMS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1974); A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN
THE ACADEMY (E. Langland & W. Gove eds., 1981); JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, FATHER-
DAUGHTER INCEST (1981); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS (1962); Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives
on Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1992); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 1 (1992); Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within
Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Summer 1992).
11. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 44 (1987); Minow, supra note 10,
at 68. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMENS' DEVELOPMENT (1982).
12. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WISC. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 85-86 (1987); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 11, at 44-45; Minow, supra note 10, at 14, 68.
13. Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 651 n.5 (1986) ("The feminist criticism is not that the
objective stance fails to be truly objective because it has social content, all the better to
exorcise that content in the pursuit of the more truly point-of-viewless viewpoint. The
criticism is that objectivity is largely accurate to its/the/a world, which world is criticized; and
that it becomes more accurate as the power it represents and extends becomes more total");
1996]
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This is not a claim that women are essentially different from
men, or that all women think and perceive the same things or
perceive them in the same way. Rather, it is a claim that one's
position within society through different biological capabilities,
different experiences, different social expectations or some
combination of these influences one's perspective in viewing the
rest of the world, and thereby influences one's understanding of the
world. 4 Insofar as most women share the possibility of becoming
pregnant for part of their lives and most also share the experience
of being relatively weaker physically than most men, social
experiences in which these two factors are implicated, such as
rape, 5 are likely to be perceived by most women in substantially
the same way. Furthermore, since no man shares the possibility of
becoming pregnant and most men have substantially more physical
strength than most women, most men's perceptions of the same
social encounters are likely to differ substantially from those shared
by most women.
Women's perceptions and understanding do overlap with those
of men because women and men are often similarly situated with
respect to some matters. Some women may see some aspects of
the world with or from a characteristically "male perspective.'
16
By the same token, some men are able to perceive and understand
at least some aspects of the world with or from a female perspec-
tive, either through experience, education and effort, or through
individual similar situation.
Jules L. Coleman, Truth and Objectivity in Law, 1 LEGAL THEORY 33, 47, 64 (1995)
(advocating the position that concepts of truth and objectivity in legal discourse are
consistent with a view that all knowledge is based on the internal point of view or
situatedness of the knower).
14. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 10, at 2, 14 ("The idea of a gendered life is not the
same as asserting the notion of 'essential' femaleness. The concept of a gendered life is
based on the belief that most differences between the sexes are socially manufactured, not
inherent.... [R]egardless of how fashioned, differences matter.").
15. 1 am not claiming that the possibility of pregnancy is the key to understanding
women's experience of rape. It is an important factor in shaping women's desire for sexual
intercourse with men they know, which, as we shall see, is implicated in men's and women's
different experiences of coerced "date sex" or "acquaintance sex." All women who have
written on rape seem to agree that the key injury caused by rape, whether by a man known
or unknown, is the violation of psychological and physical integrity experienced when one
is treated as an object rather than a subject.
16. This may be a phenomenon of "false consciousness" resulting from "training," or
because this one woman is situated with respect to the matter similarly to most men.
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Yet, despite these qualifications, reality that appears objective
to a viewer is more likely to be unexamined than truly objective.
Seeing the world from another's perspective requires, first, self-
conscious examination of how one's own views of the world have
been constructed and, second, an effort to "stand in the other's
shoes," to imagine the view from the other's vantage point in the
world in order to understand the other's "reality.,
1 7
As suggested above, one of the primary responsibilities of
scholars, or academics generally, is production of information and
analysis about the world in order to "further truth" by helping
society discover the extent to which the world or reality perceived
and described by our predecessors represents only a partial
knowledge of the world. Feminists and critical race scholars simply
assert that there are different ways "perceived reality" may be
partial, and consequently there must be different ways of overcom-
ing the limitations of past perspectives. Feminists and critical race
scholars assert that because law and legal scholarship have also
been formulated by human beings with limited perspectives, they
too must reflect limited perspectives, i" which typically are not
overtly identified and often are not conscious. Furthermore, when
seemingly neutral legal concepts have been given content through
application by the hitherto largely male, and in any event, male-
influenced participants in the legal system, they do not have a
neutral effect.' 9
Whereas traditional academic scholarship has identified
humanness with maleness and understood women only as a
peripheral category in the 'human' interpretation of reality, the
new field of women's studies not only attempts to make
'women's' agency a key interpretive category but also seeks to
transform androcentric scholarship and knowledge into truly
human scholarship and knowledge, that is, inclusive of all
people, men and women, upper and lower classes, aristocracy
and 'common people,' different cultures and races, the powerful
and the weak.2°
17. Minow, supra note 10, at 57-73.
18. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 43-48; Minow, supra note 10, at 85.
19. A central tenet of feminist legal theory is that "[o]nly the effects of a legal system
provide significant evidence of whether it is non-discriminatory." Lucinda Vandervort,
Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea, 2 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 233, 262
(1987-1988).
20. FIORENZA, supra note 8, at xx.
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Given these insights, how does one decide whether a work of
legal scholarship has "intellectual merit"? We start by returning to
the basic questions used to evaluate every work of legal scholarship
or analysis: does this work help us better understand what the law
is accomplishing, what the law should accomplish, and from whose
point of view or interest the law operates? 21 We may find that the
point of view or interests advanced by a law belongs to entrepre-
neurs, bureaucrats, environmentalists, divorced women with
children to feed and clothe, divorced men who wish to support new
families, members of- racial or ethnic or other minorities who
regularly encounter housing or job discrimination, or one of an
almost infinite number of other points of view. If a work of legal
scholarship helps us answer these three questions, then it has intel-
lectual merit despite the fact that it is published in an obscure
journal by someone who graduated from an unaccredited night
school and is never cited by articles published in prestigious
journals.
II. Rape, Male Perspectives, and the Law
The law of rape and the history of its reforms over the
last forty years provide a useful vehicle for exploring how
different experiences, yielding different perspectives, can affect
the formulation or application of legal principles. Rape provides
an appropriate vehicle for this exploration because traditionally
the person accused of rape was always a member of the dominant
group in society-men, while the accuser was always a member
of a subordinate group-women.22  While there are other
21. Despite Judge Richard A. Posner's protestations that he wants "experimentation"
in legal scholarship, he seems unwilling to accept experimentation that involves self-conscious
identification of perspective by minorities. See Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on
Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1159-61 (1990); see also Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal
Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1992).
22. More recently, many state laws on sexual assault have been drafted in gender
neutral terms, thus including male on male rape, female on female rape or, theoretically,
female on male rape. Male on male and female on female rape in particular implicate differ-
ent subordinate social groups and a source of probably even greater fear and prejudice than
heterosexual sex-, i.e., homosexuality. See MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (Gilliam C.
Mezey & Michael B. King eds., 1992). Consequently, the investigation and prosecution of
such sexual assaults probably do present many problems similar to those discussed in this
article, although for different and perhaps even more complex reasons. Because the process
of identifying biases or stereotypes through the lens of a different perspective is unique to
each perspective, this article will discuss only the rape of women by men.
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dominant/subordinate groupings within Western society, the gender
groupings involved in rape cut across all other important group
categories such as race,' religion and class. 4 Like most signifi-
cant differences among people, the male/female difference
traditionally has been freighted with the lack of understanding and
irrational fears that are particularly fertile ground for the develop-
ment of stereotypes and prejudice.
The law of rape in all English-speaking countries developed as
part of the English common law in the early 17th century. At that
time and for the three centuries that followed, all official actors in
the criminal justice system-judges, prosecutors and lawyers who
represented defendants, and eventually legislators in the former
colonies-were Anglo-Saxon males. During this period the law of
rape changed little. In the United States the American Law
Institute sponsored the drafting of a Model Penal Code during the
mid-1950s. While some attempt at law reform was made, the
process continued to be dominated by white males and little
substantive change occurred.
In the early 1960s women in the United States and other
Western countries began to talk to each other about their lives and
their common experiences as women. They began to analyze the
issues that affected women in special ways-employment opportu-
nity, sexual harassment in the workplace, divorce and custody
proceedings, and domestic abuse. Rape received early attention
from women, from women lawyers in particular, and especially
23. White feminists have been criticized by African-American women scholars for
slipping into essentialism in analyzing many women's issues because of the general but
unstated assumption that all women share the same experience, regardless of race or socio-
economic background. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
For discussions of some of the complexities that result when rape involves issues of
both gender and race, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (the
law of rape was designed and implemented to protect white women in their unofficial status
as the property of white men and has been a significant instrument of white supremacy,
carried out through lynchings in earlier times and vastly unequal conviction rates today);
Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 141 (1983) (the
legal system's treatment of rape has furthered racism by disproportionately targeting Black
men for punishment and refusing to give raped Black women redress, and has denied the
reality of all "women's sexual subordination by creating a social meaning of rape which
implies that the only type of sexual abuse is illegal rape and the only form of illegal rape is
Black offender/white victim.").
24. The trial and verdict in the rape prosecution of William Kennedy Smith provides a
recent example of the importance of class to analyzing how rape law is applied in practice.
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from women who had been raped.2" Their experiential insights
led to different kinds of sociological and psychological research on
rape26 and to fresh legal analyses of rape law.27  This article uses
this rich literature as an example of how particularized viewpoints
can give special insights on which to base legal and social reforms
that are more inclusive of previously subordinate groups.
To consider these materials in context, it is necessary first to
review some general goals and values of the common law criminal
justice system and some special problems encountered in trying to
prosecute crimes of rape and other sexual assaults.
A. Special Considerations
The common law has always stressed competing and partially
incompatible values in its criminal law. The primary purpose of the
criminal law has always been to convict and punish criminals and,
25. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975);
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); Lynne N. Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape
a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 221 (1988).
26. See, e.g., PAULINE B. BART& PATRICIA H. O'BRIEN, STOPPING RAPE: SUCCESSFUL
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES (1985); HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE:
A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1980); GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING
RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM (1993) (applying methods of
social linguistics to analyze interactions typically used in cross-examination of rape
complainants); Susan B. Bond & Donald L. Mosher, Guided Imagery of Rape: Fantasy,
Reality, and the Willing Victim Myth, 22 J. SEx RES. 162 (1986); Eugene Borgida & Phyllis
White, Social Perception of Rape Victims: The Impact of Legal Reform, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
339 (1978); James V. P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth, Sex Role Stereotyping and Reactions
to Depictions ofStranger Versus Acquaintance Rape, 45 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 344 (1983);
E. Galton, Police Processing of Rape Complaints: A Case Study, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 15 (1976);
Diana Scully & Joseph Marolla, "Riding the Bull at Gilley's": Convicted Rapists Describe the
Rewards of Rape, 32 Soc. PROB. 251 (1985).
27. For some analyses of specific state laws or proposals, see Leigh Bienen, Rape 1, 3
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 45 (1976); Legislative Note: Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law,
8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217 (1974); Christopher W. Nicoll, Idaho Code § 18-6105: A Limitation
on the Use of Evidence Relating to the Prior Sexual Conduct of the Prosecutrix in Idaho Rape
Trials, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 323 (1979); Rape and Other Sexual Offense Law Reform in
Maryland, 1976-1977,7 U. BALT. L. REV. 151 (1977); Sarah Weddington, Rape Law in Texas:
H.B. 284 and the Road to Reform, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1975-1976); E. Sue Bernie, note,
Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias Against the Victim Still Prevails,
30 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1978). For general analyses, see sources cited supra, note 25, and e.g.,
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 777 (1988); Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 277
(1993); Crenshaw, supra note 23; Vandervort, supra note 19; Robin West, Equality Theory,
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990);
Wriggins, supra note 23.
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as a result, to deter crime.2" In addition, and unlike the criminal
law systems in most if not all authoritarian societies, an important
goal of the criminal law is to prevent the conviction and punishment
of innocent people 9 through negligence or callous indifference of
officials, manipulation of the system for personal reasons by those
in power, or inadvertence. Preventing conviction of innocent
defendants has always been of particular importance where
conviction could result in lengthy imprisonment or death, as was
traditionally the case for the crime of rape.3" The high value
placed upon avoiding conviction of the innocent is reflected in rules
such as the presumption of innocence,31 the defendant's right to
confront his accuser,32 the defendant's right to defend himself
against all the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
prosecution's all important burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.33 These protections for defendants reflect the
basic policy judgment that it is better for society that some guilty
people remain unpunished than for innocent people to lose their
freedom, much less their lives.
Against this background, two evidentiary problems common in
rape trials take on special importance. First, because the crime of
rape generally lacks witnesses other than the victim, the analysis of
physical evidence plays an important role in the prosecution of the
accused offender. Until relatively recently, however, analysis of
much of the most important physical evidence produced by rapes
was beyond the competence of forensic experts. Second, rape is a
crime that involves an area of social life laden with deep-seated
taboos, inhibitions and psychological conflicts.
28. See e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.2(e), § 1.5 (1986).
29. See e.g., id. § 1.4.
30. Murder, treason and rape have been the only three capital crimes in common law
countries. Authorized or mandated prison sentences for rape traditionally ranged from 20
years to life imprisonment. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1986) (Following
the 1942 rape law reform the offense of "aggravated rape" carried the death penalty; other
rapes were punishable by a maximum term of 20 years).
31. American Law Institute, 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 1.12, 1.12
cmt. (1980).
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1), 1.12(1) cmt. (Official Draft & Rev. Comments
1980). The prosecution's burden of proof in a criminal trial is a much higher standard than
any applied in a civil action, even an action for a civil penalty such as a fine.
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B. A Male Perspective of Sexual Encounters
From the beginning, these two special problems have re-
inforced the dominant male perspective on rape and contributed to
related gender prejudices. Apparently because of the deep-seated
taboos, inhibitions and psychological conflicts associated with sex,
charges of rape that do not involve strangers are treated by police,
prosecutors, judges, juries and even a complainant's friends and
family in a substantially different manner than are rapes perpetrat-
ed by strangers. 3  This distinction appears to be grounded in
men's fear of unfounded prosecutions based solely on the word of
the complainant against the accused.35
These fears are reflected in the earliest published formulation
of and commentary on the English common law, written by Sir
Matthew Hale shortly before his death in 1676.36 In addition to
setting out the basic doctrine and evidentiary principles applicable
to the crime of rape, Lord Hale offered a now famous comment:
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought
severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must
be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party
accused, though never so innocent.37
34. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, A Rally Against Rape, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
81 (1987); ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 6-7. Estrich follows the terminology used in a 1960s
study conducted by University of Chicago Professors Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel. Rape
by an unarmed man of a woman he knows is denoted a "simple rape" to distinguish such
situations from "aggravated rapes" which involve extrinsic violence (guns, knives or
beatings), multiple assailants, or no prior relationship between the accused and the
complainant. Id. at 4. This terminology does not necessarily coincide with that of state
statutory definitions, cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1986), and has been criticized
by other feminist scholars, see, e.g., Henderson, supra note 25, at 195-96.
35. SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICrIM: A
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 207-14 (1979).
36. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS TO THE CROWN (S. Emlyn 1736).
37. Id. at 635. Hale bolstered his caution by recounting two cases of false accusations.
Both cases involved young unmarried women, one of whom was apparently encouraged by
her parents, and one case, possibly both, involved unmarried men. Id. at 627. It is possible
that such false accusations by unmarried women without dowries were actually encouraged
by the law of the day because the law provided only one punishment, execution, and permit-
ted an accuser to "redeem" the offender's life by electing to marry him. Id. The offender
could refuse the offer, id., but an unmarried man would undoubtedly think twice before
doing so. Hale does not note this possible incentive for false rape accusations, and he
provides no indication of how many convictions were obtained during the period in which
these two cases of false accusation occurred.
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Hale's caution was subsequently adopted as part of special jury
instructions for rape cases in many American jurisdictions and was
even considered mandatory by some courts.
38
The emphasis on the likelihood of false charges by complain-
ants and the bias and fear that this possibility engenders can be
seen in numerous statements of state court judges as well as in
Wigmore's influential treatise on trial evidence. Wigmore admon-
ished that: "No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the
jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physi-
cian. ,39
These opinions were not formed in a vacuum. As Wigmore's
most recent reviser notes in his defense, "Wigmore was a child of
his times."'  Those times, beginning at least in the seventeenth
century when Lord Hale was Chief Justice of the King's Bench and
continuing through the 1960s, did not simply produce general fears
and biases. They led to the formation of many specific (and some-
times conflicting) stereotypes or myths about women and rape that
in turn influenced how the law of rape was formulated and how
38. The Model Penal Code, drafted in the 1950s, retained a form of Hale's cautionary
instruction. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1980). However, all state courts that have
confronted the issue recently have held that such a cautionary instruction is not required.
E.g., Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980); Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1986);
State v. Gong, 764 P.2d 453 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988); Rhoades v. State, 468 A.2d 650 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1983); State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985); State v. Murray, 375 S.E.2d 405
(W. Va. 1988). In State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 921 (Mont. 1984), the court held that such an
instruction would constitute an improper comment on the evidence. Id.
39. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW [hereinafter
"WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE"] § 924a (3d ed. 1940) (original emphasis; footnote omitted); see
also 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1978). Wigmore justified his
caution by describing numerous "cases" of false rape accusations, most involving adolescents,
reported by two psychologists. Id. The tone of the psychologists and the evidence on which
they base their conclusions does not invite confidence in their reports by today's standards.
Feild and Bienen report in JURORS AND RAPE that the 1915 study on which Wigmore
based his recommendation, Pathological Lying, has now been repudiated, and that the 1937-
38 Report of the American Bar Association Committee on Improvements in the Law of
Evidence, which he cites in his 1940 edition as additional and independent authority for this
view was authored by Wigmore himself in his capacity as chair of the committee. FEILD &
BIENEN, supra note 26, at 200 n.108. But see 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev.
1983) (Wigmore urged "the admissability of character for unchastity [as] a necessary
safeguard against the possibility of ... prosecutions instigated by women having a
psychological disposition to 'imaginary and false charges.').
40. 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 62 n.21 (Tillers rev. 1983). The first edition of
Wigmore's treatise was published in 1904. The third edition, the last prepared by Wigmore
himself, appeared in 1940.
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general rules of trial procedure were applied-or not applied-to
rape cases. The following are some of the most prevalent of these
myths or stereotypes:
1. Women fantasize about rape and want forced sex imposed
on them.4'
2. When a woman says "no" to intercourse, she often really
means "yes.
', 42
3. "If [a woman is] going to be raped, [she] might as well relax
and enjoy it."43
4. "[Wjomen often provoke or precipitate sexual assault";'
they "seduce" men to rape them.45
5. Nice women do not get raped.46
41. Henderson, supra note 25, at 227; see FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 32.
Several researchers have found that a significant portion of convicted rapists justify their
actions by arguing that their victims enjoyed the experience despite use of weapons and
infliction of serious injuries or even death, and that the rapists had helped the victims'
fantasies come true. Check & Malamuth. supra note 26; Scully & Marolla, supra note 26.
But see Bond & Mosher, supra note 26, at 177 ("Neither the crime of rape nor the imagining
of a realistic rape generate sexual arousal, enjoyment, or pleasure.") For the importance of
distinguishing between seduction fantasies and rape fantasies, see Eugene J. Kanin, Female
Rape Fantasies: A Victimization Study, 7 VICrIMOLOGY 114 (1982).
As Nancy Friday pointed out in her pioneering work, MY SECRET GARDEN, rape
fantasies comprise a small portion of women's sexual fantasies and the women who reported
them distinguished quite carefully between the function of rape as a fantasy-to relieve the
guilt learned as "good little girls"--and the terrifying prospect of rape in reality. NANCY
FRIDAY, MY SECRET GARDEN: WOMEN'S SEXUAL FANTASIES 47-51, 76, 109-110 (1973).
42. See DONAL E.J. MACNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAW
45 (1977); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980)("Often the woman's attitude may be
deeply ambivalent. She may not want intercourse, may fear it, or may desire it but feel
compelled to say 'no."' (emphasis added)). See also Roger B. Dworkin, Note, Forcible and
Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62
YALE L.J. 55, 67 (1952); Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 680 (1966).
43. BROWNMILLER, supra note 25, at 311; see also FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at
31.
44. See Seaboyer v. Queen, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 659 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
There is a myth that a rapist is a stranger who leaps out of the bushes to attack his victim
and then abruptly leaves. Because what a complainant describes "often does not match what
jurors think rapists do, his behavior is held against her." If a woman says her rapist did
anything else, then she must be the cause of what happened. Id. at 653.
45. See LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 68 (1989); Scully & Marolla,
supra note 26.
46. See FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 31.
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6. If a woman has previously consented to have extramarital
sex, she is promiscuous and probably will consent to have sex with
any man who asks.47
7. African-American women are generally promiscuous.48
8. A woman cannot be raped against her will; "if she really
wants to prevent a rape, she can."
49
9. If a woman is raped, her natural response is to report it to
the police as soon as possible.5"
10. Men who rape are psychopathic or emotionally ill; normal
men do not commit rape.5"
11. Women are raped only by strangers; "[r]ape of a woman
by a man she knows can be defined as a 'woman who changed her
mind afterward.'
' 52
47. As articulated by The Honorable Mme. Justice L'Heureux-Dube in her dissent in
Seaboyer v. Queen, women are considered to be either "madonnas or whores." Seaboyer,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. at 652 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting). The logical result of this myth is
not only that the rapists of many ordinary women who have had multiple sexual partners are
likely to escape conviction so long as they can assert the most casual acquaintance with her
prior to the rape (even if they gain access to her home by deception!), but also that a
prostitute can never be raped so long as the rapist did not "leap out of the bushes" at her.
See BOURQUE, supra note 45, at 4-6 (describing the case of People v. Zabuski (Pasadena
Super. Ct. 1986) (dismissing the jury after complainant testified she had agreed to perform
oral copulation for $30, but defendant had then become "'extremely violent,' and forced her
to engage in sexual intercourse and sodomy")).
48. Crenshaw, supra note 23, at 1251 n.35, 1271; Wriggins, supra note 23, at 120-21.
49. See Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 651-52 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
50. See HALE, supra note 36, at 633.
51. See Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 654 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting); BOURQUE,
supra note 45, at 59 (noting that early studies of and information about rapists used to
develop and support distinct psychological portraits of rapists were derived from statistics or
studies involving incarcerated rapists). But see id. at 71-72 (noting that a number of studies
have involved successful newspaper or magazine ad solicitation of self-identified unconvicted
rapists); Check & Malamuth, supra note 26, at 351 (30 percent of all male college students
and 44 percent of "high sex role stereotyping" male college students indicated some
likelihood of committing date-or acquaintance-rape if they could be assured that no one
would know); Mary P. Koss & Kenneth E. Leonard, Sexually Aggressive Men, in PORNOG-
RAPHY & SEXUAL AGGRESSION (Malamuth & Donnerstein eds., 1984), cited in Scully &
Marolla, supra note 26, at 251 (85 percent of college men defined as highly sexually aggres-
sive had victimized women with whom they were romantically involved); Morrison Torrey,
When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions,
24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1022-24 (1991).
52. See FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 32. In other words, this stereotype reflects
the idea that if a woman consents to have intercourse with a man once, she will always
consent again. This amounts to saying that a woman's consent to intercourse with a man
extends indefinitely into the future regardless of future circumstances or changes in their
relationship. Compare the concept of consent implicit in the marital rape exception, infra
notes 140-46 and the accompanying text. But see James V.P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth,
Pornography Effects and Self-Reported Likelihood of Committing Acquaintance v. Stranger
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:4
12. If a woman has ever consented to have extramarital sex,
she cannot be trusted to tell the truth. 3
13. If a woman has a "bad character," she probably is willing
to engage in extramarital sex indiscriminately and cannot be trusted
to tell the truth.54
14. Women, or at least certain kinds of women, "deserve" to
be raped.5
15. Women cry "rape" at the least provocation56 and fre-
quently fabricate charges of rape, either because they are filled with
malice or spite toward the defendant, men in general, their
husbands or past lovers, or because they consented to extramarital
intercourse, got caught and want to escape feared punishment by
parents, husbands or lovers. 7
16. Even when a woman is not consciously lying about having
been raped, the rape may exist only in her fantasy.
58
17. Nonconsensual intercourse is, in the absence of extreme
force, merely an act of sex.59
Rape, Paper Presented Before Midwestern Psychological Assoc., Minneapolis (May 1982)
(laboratory study indicates that acquaintance rape is a significantly more likely occurrence
than stranger rape) cited in Check & Malamuth, supra note 26, at 353; FEILD & BIENEN,
supra note 26, at 76 (significant proportion of reported rapes involve an assailant known to
the victim); Scully & Marolla, supra note 26, at 251.
53. See infra notes 203-214 and accompanying text.
54. See Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 652-53, 655 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting) (citing
L. Clark & D. Lewis, A Study of Rape in Canada: Phases 'C' and 'D', Report to the Donner
Foundation of Canada (1976)).
55. See BOURQUE, supra note 45, at 68; Scully & Marolla, supra note 26, at 257-58.
56. See Henderson, supra note 25, at 227.
57. See Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 653 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting); Henderson,
supra note 25, at 227 ("women are lying, scheming, castrating bitches").
In fact, rape victims do not appear to lie any more frequently than victims of other
violent crimes, L. Curtis, Victim Precipitation and Violent Crime, 21 SOC. PROB. 594 (1974),
cited in FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 46, and crime statistics indicate that rape has
always been a seriously underreported crime, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1975) [hereinafter
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT]. Cf. Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call
My Good Nature 'Deceit:' A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374
(1993).
58. See Seaboyer, [19911 2 S.C.R. at 654 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting)(citing
MARILYN G. STANLEY, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RAPE VICTIM WITH THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM PRIOR TO BILL C-127, at 39-40 (Dep't Just. Ottawa 1985)).
59. According to some feminists, rape is an act of violence that has nothing to do with
sex. This would seem to be as much a distortion as the proposition that rape is merely an
act of sex. Rape clearly is an act of violence, always from the woman's point of view and
often from the man's. See Scully & Marolla, supra note 26, at 255-57. It seems equally clear
that rape is an act of sex in most, if not all, cases of acquaintance rape or date rape.
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These stereotypes' present a male view of rape that appears
to reify the male fear of consensual intercourse followed by a false
allegation of rape and a jury's sympathetic response to that
allegation. More fundamentally, these stereotypes reflect a
confusion between coerced intercourse and consensual inter-
course,6' between "forcible rape," "true aggression," "reluctant
submission" and "desired intimacy, '  and a difficulty in separat-
ing a man's own desire from the woman's desire or consent. The
contradictions between some of the different stereotypes appear to
derive from the mythical dual nature attributed to women by men:
woman is virgin or whore, goddess or witch, earth mother or curse
to "mankind."63
As recently as twenty years ago these myths or stereotypes
were still generally subscribed to and impacted every aspect of the
legal system's response to a rape allegation. While somewhat less
prevalent today, their effect may still be felt at any stage of a
complaint. Stereotypes continue to affect whether the police will
believe a complainant or categorize her charge as "unfounded,"
whether the prosecutor will elect to proceed with the charge,
whether a judge will issue a warrant, what evidence the judge will
admit at trial, the defense lawyer's strategy and tactics,64 the
judge's instructions to the jury,65 and the extent to which the jury
follows those instructions or redefines elements of the law by
ignoring them. Stereotypes affect how a woman's friends and
acquaintances, perhaps even her husband, react to her account of
Furthermore, studies of convicted rapists have shown that even stranger rape frequently
involves high excitement, low risk sexual gratification for the rapist. Id. at 257-60; see also
FULD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 52-53, Table 3-2, Item 19. Cf. Henderson, supra note 25,
at 225 ("Rape is a form of soul murder.").
60. See also Martha R. Burt & Rochelle S. Albin, Rape Myths, Rape Definitions and
Probability of Conviction, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 212, 217 (1981); Neil M. Malamuth,
Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. SOC. IssuEs 138, 140-42 (1981); Vandervort, supra note
19, at 258 n.41, 260 n.54.
Torrey has summarized these classic rape myths into four categories. See Torrey, supra
note 51, at 1025-31.
61. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1095 (1986); Henderson, supra note 25, at
225; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Rape: On Coercion and Consent, in CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 171, 175 (1989).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt.2 (1980).
63. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 652 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting); see Henderson,
supra note 25, at 227.
64. See Elizabeth A. Sheehy, Canadian Judges and the Law of Rape: Should the Charter
Insulate Bias?, 21 OTTAWA L. REV. 741, 774-75 (1989).
65. See, e.g., supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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the experience. Stereotypes may even lead the complainant to
wonder in inappropriate as well as appropriate cases whether she
could have avoided the attack.
A closer look at "unfounded charges" statistics is instructive.
Until social scientists began to research the meaning of rape
statistics in the 1980s, men's fears of false rape complaints were
regularly reinforced by police statistics showing high rates of "false
reports" of rape. The new research has shown that many of those
older statistics were actually statistics of "unfounded charges" by
police, i.e., those for which the police did not recommend prosecu-
tion.66 The reasons the charges were considered "unfounded"
varied as widely as the statistics, depending on who did the report-
ing and the criteria used. For example, in Denver in the late 1960s
the unfounded charges rate for alleged rapes was twenty-five
percent, because police considered all acquaintance rapes where the
parties were believed to have had prior sexual relations to be
seductions, and therefore classified all such rape claims as unfound-
ed.67 New York City had similar statistics until the city began
requiring all reports on alleged rapes to be taken by female police
officers. The rate of unfounded rape charges then dropped to two
percent.68
In addition to influencing how actors in the criminal justice
system react to a rape charge, there are a number of specific ways
that male perspectives have shaped and continue to shape the
content of the law of rape, the evidentiary rules that govern how
a judge and jury will consider a charge of rape, and the application
of evidentiary and other rules in specific cases.
C. How Perspective Shapes the Law
1. The Definition. -Just prior to the early 1970s, the law of
rape in all common law jurisdictions was remarkably similar to that
described by Lord Hale in the seventeenth century. The typical
statute or court decision defined rape as "[t]he act of sexual
intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife and
without her consent, committed when the woman's resistance is
66. See Torrey, supra note 51, at 1028-29.
67. KATz & MAZUR, supra note 35, at 207-09.
68. Id.
69. The earliest phrase used was "carnal knowledge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427
(rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citing Gore v. State, 46 S.E. 671 (Ga. 1904)).
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overcome by force or fear."7  The interpretation of these
definitions was generally quite uniform. In addition to proving at
least some degree of penetration7' and that the complainant was
not married to the defendant, courts also required the prosecution
to prove that the accused had used force or that the complainant
either offered substantial resistance or failed to resist only because
of reasonable fear for her safety, or both.7 ' A complainant's
reasonable fear for her safety tended to require proof of an explicit
threat of force.73 Courts also typically required a prompt com-
plaint about the assault by the complainant,74 and proof that the
complainant was "chaste., 75  Many courts required the woman to
resist to her utmost.76 Words alone were not enough to indicate
a lack of consent,77 and some courts required the complainant's
active resistance to "persist until the offense is consummated.,
78
If the complainant's consent appeared to be merely "reluctant,"
defined as something less than what results from fear of serious
injury or death, or consent arising only after a struggle, it was
nevertheless valid consent constituting a complete defense to the
rape charge.79 The accused did not have to assert or defend his
70. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1260 (6th ed. 1990)(citing State v. Lora, 515 P.2d 1086,
1093 (Kan. 1973)).
71. Id.; HALE, supra note 36, at 628.
72. See M. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 341 (6th ed. 1995). Judges and commentators who approve of this objective
standard for the kind or amount of fear that will justify a woman's failure to resist agree that
in some circumstances, at least where the complainant was jumped from behind and a gun
is pointed to her head, it is reasonable not to resist at all. Id.
73. Goldberg v. Maryland, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
74. State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1171 (Wash. 1988). This doctrine also dates back to
the seventeenth century. See HALE, supra note 36, at 633.
75. In all jurisdictions a victim's chastity was considered relevant to whether she had
consented to act and/or whether her testimony should be considered credible. In addition,
in a smaller number of jurisdictions chastity of the victim was an essential element of the
statutory offense which the prosecution had to prove to the satisfaction of the jury. See IA
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 n.10 (Tillers rev. 1983).
76. E.g., State v. Cottengim, 12 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Mo. 1934); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1
cmt. 4 n.86 (1980).
77. E.g., Welch v. State, 198 S.E. 810, 811 (Ga. App. 1938); Goldberg, 395 A.2d 1213;
Selvage v. State, 27 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Neb. 1947); Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 539 (Wis.
1906).
78. Brown, 106 N.W. at 538; see Selvage, 27 N.W.2d at 637.
79. See Welch, 198 S.E. at 811; Goldberg, 395 A.2d 1213.
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own chastity since this was deemed to be irrelevant to his credibili-
ty"° and prejudicial to the question of his innocence.
2. Nonconsent, Resistance and Force. -A statutory
definition of rape may include one, two or all of the elements of
nonconsent, resistance and force. However, regardless of the
formal terms of the definition, the close interrelationship of the
three elements, both theoretically and practically, brings forth much
of the same dynamic. In the past that dynamic has been strongly
shaped by the perspective of the accused, a distinctly male point of
view, to the exclusion of the complainant's, i.e. female, perspective.
a. Consent. -The inclusion of the element of nonconsent
in the definition of rape appears to be essential. What, after all, is
rape but nonconsensual intercourse? As an element of the crime,
nonconsent must be proved by the prosecution. At the beginning
of the prosecution's case, doubts about the woman's credibility,
especially with regard to her sexual relations with a man she knows,
were crucial. Lord Hale's admonition that a rape accusation is
even harder to defend than to prove seems to have resonated in
male rape fantasy-fears in which the testimony of a woman and a
man are pitted against each other with no extrinsic evidence to
support or disprove either side. Of course, the prosecutor still
carries the burden of proof in such situations, and the proof
required must be "beyond a reasonable doubt." These general
protections of the criminal justice system were perceived to be
inadequate. The woman's lack of consent needed to be confirmed,
and her resistance was seen as a possible source of such confirma-
tion.
The requirement for confirmatory evidence of a woman's
nonconsent also reflects men's fantasies of women's fantasies,
specifically the belief that women wish to be seduced because
society constrains them from requesting directly, and perhaps even
from recognizing within themselves a desire for, sexual contact.8
80. See, e.g., State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895) (Burgess, J.) ("It is a matter
of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the
remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that
of a woman."). Contra id. (Gantt, J., dissenting).
81. See Power v. State, 30 P.2d 1059, 1060 (Ariz. 1934); Davis v. State, 48 S.E. 180, 181
(Ga. 1904); State v. Anderson, 137 N.W.2d 781, 783 (Minn. 1965); State v. Wulff, 260 N.W.
515, 516 (Minn. 1935).
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An often cited and influential student note appeared in the
Yale Law Journal in 1952.' This note tackled head-on the
question of what women want:
Relying on Freud, the author points out that it is not simply
that women lie, although there is an "unusual inducement to
malicious or psychopathic accusation inherent in the sexual
nature of the crime." Even the "normal girl" is a confused and
ambivalent character when it comes to sex with men she knows.
Her behavior is not always an accurate guide to her true
desires, for it may suggest resistance when in fact the woman is
enjoying the physical struggle:
When her behavior looks like resistance although her
attitude is one of consent, injustice may be done the man
by the woman's subsequent accusation. Many women, for
example, require as a part of preliminary 'love play'
aggressive overtures by the man. Often their erotic
pleasure may be enhanced by, or even depend upon, an
accompanying physical struggle. The 'love bite' is a
common, if mild, sign of the aggressive component in the
sex act. And the tangible signs of struggle may survive to
support a subsequent accusation by the woman.
And if a woman is ambivalent about sex, it follows that it would
be unfair to punish the man who was not acting entirely against
her wish.
[A] woman's need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the
unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion
serving neatly to avoid the guilt feeling which might arise
after willing participation ... Where such an attitude of
ambivalence exists, the woman may, nonetheless, exhibit
behavior which would lead the fact finder to conclude that
she opposed the act. To illustrate ... the anxiety resulting
from this conflict of needs may cause her to flee from the
situation of discomfort, either physically by running away,
or symbolically be retreating to such infantile behavior as
crying.83
82. See generally Dworkin, supra note 42. As Estrich observes, this Note is cited, with
apparent influence, in connection with the MODEL PENAL CODE provisions adopted in 1955
and also in the comments to them edited in the 1970s and published in 1980. ESTRICH, supra
note 25, at 121 n.42. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
83. ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 39 (quoting Dworkin, supra note 42, at 66-68).
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This belief system is also reflected in a student note published in
the 1966 Stanford Law Review:
"Although a woman may desire sexual intercourse, it is cus-
tomary for her to say, 'no, no, no' (although meaning 'yes, yes,
yes') and to expect the male to be the aggressor .. .It is always
difficult in rape cases to determine whether the female really
meant 'no'. .. ."
The problem of determining what the female "really
meant" is compounded when, in fact, the female had no clearly
determined attitude-that is, her attitude was one of ambiva-
lence. Slovenko explains that often a woman faces a "trilemm-
a"; she is faced with a choice among being a prude, a tease, or
an "easy lay." Furthermore a woman may note a man's brutal
nature and be attracted to him rather than repulsed. Masochist-
ic tendencies seem to lead many women to seek men who will
ill-treat them sexually.'
b. Resistance. -Ideally a woman's resistance should confirm
her nonconsent. But since a demure or conflicted woman who
wished to be seduced without blame was expected to offer some
degree of token resistance, her claim of resistance also needed
confirmation. The extent to which she resisted or failed to resist
was adopted as a measure of a complainant's nonconsent. In
contrast to the former credibility battle, the requirement of
resistance provided a source of extrinsic evidence. If the complain-
ant exhibited bruises or other marks of force or struggle, then her
testimony of coercion was considered reliable.85
The next step was an inference that "resistance" actually
means utmost resistance. This inference is closely akin to the
doctrine which posits that "mere words" do not suffice to give the
defendant notice of the complainant's nonconsent. Both doctrines
relate to the stereotypes that generally women want sexual inter-
course (and so would presumably offer only token resistance to
most men), and that a woman will say "no" to sexual intercourse
when she means "yes" because, consciously or unconsciously, she
wishes to be seduced. The stereotypes behind these doctrines were
supported by many conflicting societal mores, theological tenets of
84. The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, supra note 42, at 682 (quoting Ralph
Slovenko, A Panoramic Overview: Sexual Behavior and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND
THE LAW 5, 51 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965)(emphasis added)).
85. See ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 29.
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religious institutions and theories of Freudian psychology. The
important issues are what were the source of these values, 6 and
whether these values have shaped the law in ways which are
inconsistent with the law's most basic goals of justice and protection
for the greatest number of members of society.
The requirement of utmost resistance manifests a lack of
concern about whether the law should encourage women to engage
in strenuous physical resistance to a sex attack, conduct that is
likely to result in her serious injury. In fact, advice given by police,
law and order groups, and others for many years conflicted on
whether it was to a woman's advantage or disadvantage to resist an
attacker strenuously. 7 Some recent research indicates that rape
victims who physically resist and combine their resistance with one
or more other strategies are indeed more likely to escape an at-
tempted rape.'8 However, other recent research indicates persua-
sively that those rape victims who attempt physical resistance to
sexual attacks are significantly more likely to be injured than those
who do not. 9 A woman making an assessment, often within a few
seconds and always under extreme stress, about whether physical
resistance is more likely to result in escape or serious injury should
be excused if she concludes that something less than utmost
resistance might yield the greatest benefit. Until recently, however,
courts simply did not address this issue, and many assumed that a
lack of serious injury provided strong evidence of consent.9"
86. For example, the church is a patriarchal institution, and neither the seventeenth nor
the nineteenth centuries were receptive to women's sexuality or strength. This general lack
of receptivity is well exemplified by the female monarchs of England during this
period-Elizabeth, who was notable as being a unique example of a strong female ruler and
who never married and encouraged a myth of virginity in order to maintain her power, Mary,
whose husband, William of Orange, effectively wielded the power of the throne even though
the succession had passed to her; and Victoria, who deferred to her husband during his life
and cultivated an image of domesticity throughout her long reign.
87. Many police officers have long suggested that apparent compliance or efforts to
distract an assailant will often be more effective in avoiding injury to a woman. JEANNE C.
MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMrrs OF LAW REFORM 21-22 (1982).
88. BART & O'BRIEN, supra note 26, at 105.
89. KADISH ET AL., supra note 72, at 336 n.b.
90. See, e.g., Sheehy, supra note 64, at 741 (quoting P. PATULLO, JUDGING WOMEN: A
STUDY OF ATTITUDES THAT RULE OUR SYSTEM 20-21 (1983) (quoting J. David Wild,
Cambridge Crown Court, 1982 ("If a woman does not want [to be raped] she has only to
keep her legs shut and she would not get it without force and there would be marks of force
being used."))).
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Recent social science research shows that only twelve percent
of rape victims attempt physical resistance to a sexual attack.9"
The Revised Comments to the Model Penal Code observe that a
woman may "quite rationally decide[] to 'consent' rather than risk
being killed or injured."92 But equally rational behavior, such as
pleading with a threatening rapist to use a condom to prevent the
possible transmission of HIV, has occasionally clouded the issue of
consent for a grand jury and prevented indictment.93
The utmost resistance doctrine has resulted in what Professor
Estrich calls an uncodified "reasonable victim" standard for
assessing the complainant's behavior.9" Many courts have disre-
garded a complainant's claim that she did not consent to the
intercourse unless the complainant could prove that she had
exhibited the resistance of "one who does not scare easily, one who
does not feel vulnerable, one who is not passive, one who fights
91. KADISH ET AL,, supra note 72, at 336 n.b. In 1985 Pauline Bart and Patricia
O'Brien published their study of ninety-four women who had been attacked and either had
avoided being raped or had been raped. After noting the relatively small number of women
who had used physical force to resist their attacker, the authors warned, "the groups of
women who spoke to us were obviously those who had survived attacks, and were not
permanently, totally, or nearly totally incapacitated. The women whose horrible deaths are
reported with relish in lurid media accounts are not in our sample." BART & O'BRIEN,
supra note 26, at 105.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980).
93. No Bill in Rape Case Prompts Outrage; Suspect Wore a Condom at Woman's
Request, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 10, 1992, at A30. Later one of the grand jurors told a local
television station that several of the jurors believed the woman's request (to put on a
condom to prevent the transmission of AIDS) to the intruder, who was brandishing a knife,
"suggested willing participation." Man Is Convicted of Rape in Case Involving Condom, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1993, at A12. Following a public outcry, which included public demonstra-
tions by Austin women, the district attorney sought and obtained an indictment from a
second grand jury. Christy Hope, Rapist Gets 40 Years: Consent Defense in Condom Case
Unsuccessful, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 15, 1993, at A33. Other rape defendants have
not been successful with the "condom means Consent" defense. Cindy Loose & Patrice
Gaines, Condom Doesn't Mean Consent, Jury Says, WASH. POST, July 14, 1993, at C3.
However, the increasing use of condoms by rapists to avoid not only sexually
transmitted diseases but also genetic identification is hampering rape prosecutions nationally
because the lack of semen eliminates corroborating evidence that is still considered essential
by many juries. Scott Ladd, Attackers Using Condoms: Wary of AIDS, Court's Use of
Genetic IDs, NEWSDAY, Jan. 7, 1990, at 5; Craig Wolff, Rapists and Condoms: Is Use a
Cavalier Act or a Way to Avoid Disease and Arrest?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at B1 (rape
crisis clients report condom use in 15-20% of incidents in some areas).
Cf. Mary Anne Bobinski, Women and HIV: A Gender-Based Analysis of a Disease and
Its Legal Regulation, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 7, 43-45 n.155 (1994) (discussing the difficulties
in tort actions by women for HIV transmission when consent defenses are asserted because
of male-female power imbalances in many relationships).
94. ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 65.
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back, not cries. ''95  This "reasonable victim" is clearly based on a
male victim model-admittedly the model best known to the male
judges and lawyers who formulated it, but not a model appropriate
for a class of victims almost entirely female.96
It is telling that no such "reasonable victim" standard applies
to other violent crimes such as murder or assault.97 Nor is this
"reasonable victim" standard equivalent to the long sought
recognition that a reasonable woman might assess certain poten-
tially tortious behavior differently than the reasonable man accused
of such behavior.98 This is a standard developed by men from the
perspective of men and then imposed on female victims without
regard to whether most women actually conform to the standard.
In addition, the "notice" that nonconsenting sexual assault
victims are required to give-resistance to the point of injury or
fear of death or serious injury-is markedly different from the
notice that is required of victims of other crimes for which consent
is an absolute defense. For example, property owners may show
nonconsent to trespass if they have given notice with "mere words"
on a tree poster or in a verbal warning.99 Similarly, defendants
accused of robbery generally have been unsuccessful in claiming
that their victims cooperated with the taking of their money or that
they otherwise consented by making it easy for the accused. For
a consent defense to succeed, the robber would have to show active
95. Id. See also State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720,733 (Md. Ct. App. 1981) (Cole, J., dissent-
ing)("She must follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere
words, the violation of her person.... She must make it plain that she regards such sexual
acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.").
. 96. Until quite recently, this was a wholly female class if only the prosecuted cases were
considered.
97. Henderson, supra note 25, at 204.
98. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991). Adopting a "reasonable
woman" standard for the assessment of allegations of sexual harassment, the court stated:
in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus
on the perspective of the victim. If we only examined whether a reasonable
person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of
reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination.. . . Men, who are rarely victims
of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation
of the social setting or the underling threat of violence that a woman may
perceive.
Id. at 878-79 (internal citations omitted). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of
Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1398 (1992); Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1411 (1992).
99. See ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 40, 121-22 nn.46-47.
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collusion by the victim. l °  In contrast, as Estrich pointed out,
only in a rape prosecution is "passive submission ' ' t or "passive
assent"1 2 sufficient to constitute consent to the crime.
c. Force. -In an effort to reform rape laws by shifting the
focus of rape trials from complainants to defendants, some jurisdic-
tions have adopted definitions of rape that require a showing of
force or violence or a threat of force or violence. In Michigan, for
example, the legislature eliminated the element of consent, defining
rape solely in terms of the type and amount of force used by the
accused. 3 Certain types of behavior, for example the display of
a weapon, are per se unlawfully coercive. °4 Yet the old tradition
of requiring that the force used by a man be sufficient to have
caused serious bodily injury to the complainant remains strong
10 5
Even the Michigan law omits many instances of coerced sex not
involving violence which women may well classify as rape. As
applied, these requirements remain consistent with many of the old
stereotypes-that women really want to be seduced, that they find
some coercion acceptable, if not exciting, and that the law must
incorporate precautions against rape charges that are fabricated
after consensual intercourse (which, it is still presumed, is the only
intercourse that would not have resulted in injury).1"
Defining force to require injury, whether by statutory defini-
tion or application, means that if a woman submits to sexual
intercourse out of fear because of an implicit threat of force (for
example, when she is cornered by a man who is significantly larger
or stronger than she), then there will be no rape conviction if the
aggressor does not verbalize any specific threat and denies that he
would have seriously harmed the complainant if she had failed to
submit. Yet, this approach is simply a different means of imposing
the requirement of strong physical resistance on the complainant.
The requirement forces a woman to make the choice between rape
accompanied by serious injury or rape without serious injury which
100. See ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 40-41, 122 n.48.
101. State v. Neely, 300 P. 561 (Mont. 1931).
102. State v. Natalie, 135 So. 34 (La. 1931).
103. 39 MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(b)(1)(a)-(f)(West 1991).
104. Id.
105. See ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 86-87.
106. As to the effects of various attempts at rape reform, see Chamallas, supra note 27,
at 799-800.
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leaves her to live, often in the same neighborhood, with an
unpunished, unchastened attacker.
This difficulty is also directly implicated by the doctrine which
posits that "reluctant consent" received from a woman only after
the use of "some force,"1" is nevertheless legally valid consent.
Such coerced consent would not be valid consent for any other
purpose in criminal or tort law."'8
d. Overall Effect of the Doctrines. -As we have seen,
requirements for force used by the defendant and resistance by and
injury to the complainant all have been used as proxies for the
element of nonconsent.'" As proxies, they are merely evidence,
not true measures, of the complainant's state of mind. This
emphasis is contrary to the usual focus in criminal law on the
defendant's state of mind.
It is possible to theorize that, if a man has the worst possible
attitude, but a woman still wants intercourse with him for some
reason, perhaps as self-punishment, then no criminal harm has
occurred. One might then say that it is not unjust to punish the
accused, but in the absence of criminal harm there is no crime in
fact, or perhaps there is an "attempted rape" at most. In such a
case, focusing on the woman's state of mind to the exclusion of the
man's would seem to be an appropriate approach. One might
dismiss this case as simply an extreme hypothetical, unlikely to be
realized except in the rarest case.n ° Or one could interpret it as
another version of the old myths that women want forced sexual
contact or do not know what they want, or that they want contra-
dictory things at the same time."'
The underlying policy problem is that the doctrines of
nonconsent, resistance and force have functioned to help men
obtain what they want from women, however much lip service the
male establishment has given to female chastity and virginity.
These doctrines do not aid women in protecting their freedom of
107. Welch v. State, 198 S.E. 810, 811 (Ga. App. 1938).
108. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(d)(1980) (consent is not valid if it results
from coercion). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. j (1977) (consent under
duress invalid).
109. See ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 22, 29, 52 (force and nonconsent are substitutes for
the traditional mens rea requirement).
110. After all, the woman who had desired the sexual contact as self-punishment would
have had to change her mind sufficiently to prosecute.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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choice,"1 2 much less their emotional and physical integrity. The
police and prosecutorial biases and rape trial verdicts that these
doctrines produce encourage men to be coercive toward women
from whom they want a primarily sexual relationship.113 The
effect of these doctrines, whether framed in terms of the complain-
ant's resistance or the force used by the defendant, is to define
acceptable consensual intercourse to include intercourse induced by
a considerable degree of fear, coercion or intimidation.1 14  Such
a definition contradicts the usual definition of consent, whether it
is consent in the context of an affirmative defense to a non-rape
criminal charge. 5 or consent in the context of harm to a property
interest.1 16 In these contexts consent is vitiated by duress, which
does not require the use of force. Duress is defined as "a threat of
unlawful conduct [such as assault, battery or imprisonment] that is
intended to prevent and does prevent another from exercising free
will and judgment in [her] conduct." '117 To call such conduct
"seduction" must appear to a woman subject to such a threat, even
when only implied, as an Orwellian use of language.
11 8
None of these doctrines would appear necessary to protect
innocent men from unfounded rape charges if an innocent man is
defined as one who has sought a truly consensual relationship.
Such a man will adapt to a change in the law that makes "no mean
no."119 Nor are these doctrines necessary to protect innocent
defendants from patently false charges of rape. Without the
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980).
113. While male police and prosecutors have been shown to have their fair share of
stereotypical attitudes, their behavior is also influenced by their desires to present or
prosecute only "winnable" cases. Of course, this calls for conservative predictions about the
verdicts that judges and juries will return.
114. Michele N-K Collison, "A Sure-Fire Winner Is to Tell Her You Love Her; Women
Fall for It All the Time": Men Talk Frankly With Counselor to Assess Harassment and
Acquaintance Rape, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 1991, at Al (showing how coercion
and deception are tied together in aggressive attitudes).
115. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 cmnt. f (1977).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
119. There may still be relationships in which a man desiring a truly consensual
relationship and accepting that "no means no" is nevertheless mistaken about whether the
woman is consenting. Reluctant consent to a relationship, much less sexual contact, can result
when a woman feels trapped economically, is unwilling to risk separation from her children,
or for other unfortunate reasons that truly have nothing to do with implicit force or violence.
It seems doubtful that a woman who actually says "yes" to sexual intercourse in such
situations is thereby raped. See also Coombs, supra note 27, at 311-12.
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doctrines of force and resistance the question of whether the
intercourse was consensual is still a question of fact for the jury to
decide based on all of the evidence, including the credibility of both
the defendant and the complainant.
Thus, the common law emphasis on the amount of resistance
that the complainant exhibited or failed to exhibit seems to reflect
a male perspective of rape. This emphasis has deflected attention
from the defendant's coercive behavior, which is the appropriate
focus in a trial where the purpose is to determine whether his
actions were criminal.12°
3. Mens Rea. -Traditionally, rape was considered to be a
crime without a requirement of a mens rea.21 While mens rea
literally means the defendant's "mental state," legally it denotes the
presence of a "guilty mind." In theory, rape was a strict liability
offense; if a man employed force for the purpose of engaging in
intercourse without the woman's consent, he would be guilty,
regardless of whether he intended to commit rape.
The reality has been far different. In the first place, the most
common defense offered-that the intercourse was consensual-
was actually a claim about the intent of the accused as much as that
of the complainant, even if this remained unstated. In addition, the
legal system has encouraged courts to scrutinize the complainant's
behavior as possible "provocation" of the assault. It has not been
uncommon for a rape trial to focus more on the woman's behavior,
and the light that her sexual history might shed on her motivation
for engaging in certain behavior, than on what the accused did or
did not do."
As we have seen, this courtroom examination of the complain-
ant's conduct is conducted essentially through male eyes. Thus, the
viewpoint or "mental state" of the accused is in fact taken into
120. ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 29, 32; Henderson, supra note 25, at 207.
121. As noted earlier, Estrich maintains that the doctrines of nonconsent, resistance and
force have served as substitutes for the mens rea usually required of a criminal defendant.
See Henderson, supra note 25, at 211.
122. See e.g., CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 17-20, 23, 24-26, 162-71 (1992). Admittedly, given the
structure of the definition of rape, this preoccupation with the woman's conduct is to some
extent necessary to determine whether the woman in fact consented to intercourse with the
accused. The focus of this article is on the total effect of the system on female complainants




account even if it is not the conscious focus of the judicial system.
The court's examination of the complainant's conduct becomes, in
practice, a way of showing the absence of the defendant's "guilty
mind."
If the male point of view was employed to examine the mental
state of the accused directly, that would reflect society's general
concern with preventing punishment of defendants who lack a
"guilty mind." Applied to the woman's conduct, however, the male
point of view objectifies the woman and denies the reality of her
viewpoint.1"' This system also reinforces, and therefore encourag-
es, the apparent implicit assumption that a man has a right to have
sex with a woman whose appearance or behavior arouses him
regardless of whether she says "no" or resists in some other way.
The system resonates with the myths that "normal" men do not
commit rape, and that rape is simply about sex. It fails to ac-
knowledge the existence of a different reality for women1 24 or to
encourage men to understand, acknowledge or respond to that
different reality.
A number of rape defendants have not only accepted this
traditional mode of dealing with "mental state" but have also
pushed it to the next logical conclusion, offering "mistaken belief
in consent" as a defense. Thus, they argue that their belief was a
mistake of fact; a mistake made in interpreting the complainant's
behavior to mean that she had consented when, based on her
testimony after the fact, she apparently had not consented."z
Relying on the traditional meaning of mens rea as guilty intent,
these defendants argue that, so long as they actually believed a
woman had consented to have intercourse, then her actual behavior
or protestations to the contrary and the amount of force used are
irrelevant." 6 All commentators discussing this issue prior to
1986,27 as well as the courts which have considered the issue,128
123. Cf. Henderson, supra note 25, at 225 (the experience of being raped is the
experience of "soul murder").
•124. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1095, 1104-05
(1987).
125. See, e.g., McQuirk v. State, 4 So. 775 (Ala. 1888). Cf. United States v. Short, 16
C.M.R. 11, 19 (C.M.A. 1954) ("[W]hether the woman's conduct was such as to lead the
accused to believe she had consented to his acts" is a question for the military court, not for
the accused's sole personal evaluation).
126. See State v. Crawford, 602 So.2d 952 (S.C. 1992).
127. See sources cited in Vandervort, supra note 19, at 236-37 n.4.
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have likewise characterized it as a mistake of fact that vitiates the
defendant's mens rea.129
In 1987 the Canadian Journal of Women and Law published
a thorough reanalysis in the context of rape, by Lucinda
Vandervort, of the Canadian doctrines of mistake of fact and
mistake of law and their common law antecedents.13 ° Vandervort
argues that the analytic bind induced by the traditional character-
ization of this defense as a mistake of fact is unnecessary. She
proposes that judges and prosecutors reinterpret the meaning of
nonconsent and incorporate into its definition, as an element of the
crime, the standard of conduct required by the law when a person
confronts manifestations of possible nonconsent to sexual con-
tact.' Thus, an element of sexual assault would be any action
taken to coerce sexual contact when a person does not explicitly
affirm her consent. Lack of such explicit affirmance of consent
would be, as a matter of law, nonconsent. Vandervort points out
that "[tihe primary function of positive law is to establish and
enforce standards of conduct. Determinations of individual
culpability are necessary as a means to achieve that end. Reliance
on community standards to determine when legal standards may be
enforced is counterproductive when the standards are in con-
flict.' ' 32
The recharacterization proposed by Vandervort would require
no additional legislation in most jurisdictions. As a result of the
recharacterization, a defendant's claim that he believed in good
faith that the complainant had consented when she had not done
or said anything to indicate affirmative consent would be a mistake
128. See, e.g., Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 613 (defendant's mistaken belief in
complainant's consent need be honest, but need not be reasonable); Regina v. Tolson, [1989]
23 Q.B.D. 168, (Can. 1989); Vandervort, supra note 19, at 245 n.16.
129. Some commentators have pointed out that this rule encouraged men to ignore
women's attempts to communicate their nonconsent, so that the existence of the defense in
effect condoned sexual assault.
The mistake of fact defense first was used in statutory rape cases. In such a case, a
defendant would be guilty if he claimed that he did not know the age below which rape
became a strict liability offense. He would be protected if he claimed to have believed at
the time that the girl he had raped was above the statutory age. See, e.g., People v. Heman-
dez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
130. Vandervort, supra note 19, passim.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 241 n.9.
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of law, which is not a defense at common law,133 in Canada 13 4
or in the United States.'35 This recharacterization, accompanied
in each jurisdiction by publicity sufficient to provide the requisite
notice to the jurisdiction's residents,'36 would at one stroke elimi-
nate the contradiction now existing between the broader public
policies proclaimed by the law and the troubling effects of the
current interpretation of the mistaken consent defense.
There has, in the past, been an apparent general social
acceptance of intercourse which results from a woman's "reluctant
submission" to a man's nonviolent but coercive insistence.
Although numerous jury verdicts indicate that much of society has
accepted such situations in the past, it is not clear why this should
dictate the applicable legal standard. The purpose of the law of
rape is to "protect[] the female's freedom of choice and punish[]
unwanted and coerced intimacy."' 37 The purpose of the criminal
law is to achieve justice for society as a whole, balancing each
defendant's interest in receiving a full hearing under fair proce-
dures and rules against the interest of society in deterring similar
offenses. Judges and prosecutors should interpret the law to aid
rather than to hinder these purposes. It is the current reluctance
to define what is necessary to show consent as a matter of law and
the continued characterization of contradictory testimony by the
complainant and the accused (as to what she meant by her conduct)
as a mistake of fact which perpetuates the use of "generally
recognized social definitions [of rape] commonly used in the
community."3'
Nor has the idea that a woman's expression of consent must be
affirmative (as if affirmative consent were inconsistent with soft
music and the subtlety of romance) been whole-heartedly accepted.
133. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 40-41 (M. Howe ed., MacMillan
1968)(" Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it.... [T]o admit the excuse at all
would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know
and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the
other side of the scales.").
134. Vandervort, supra note 19, at 238 (citing CRIM. CODE CAN. R.S.C. c. C-34, § 19
(1995)).
135. State v. Woods, 179 A. 1 179 (Vt. 1935). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)
§ 2.04(3) (1980)(lack of knowledge or mistake about the law defining the offense is affirma-
tive defense only if the statute or other enactment defining the offense has not been reason-
ably made public or the law provides that such ignorance or mistake constitutes an offense).
136. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(a) (1980).
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980).
138. Vandervort, supra note 19, at 253.
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It is not so hard, however, to envisage a society in which inter-
course does not occur until after one of the parties has murmured,
"Let's make love. Wouldn't you like that?" and the other has
actually said "yes."' 39 Nor is it difficult to imagine a society in
which even couples who have established a pattern of making love
in certain circumstances are expected to manifest affirmative
consent each time, even though nonverbal positive actions should
then be sufficient.
4. Marital Rape. -At common law a man could not rape
his own wife. The reason given by Lord Hale, and most subse-
quent commentators, was that a wife consented to all sexual
intercourse with her husband for the duration of their marriage.t4
Presumably this reason was based on the idea that the very purpose
of marriage is to permit intercourse. Some commentators have also
suggested that the exemption was initially based on the wife's lack
of juridical standing as a separate person at common law. 4' Both
lines of reasoning, and the exemption itself, are now discredited
among most commentators and have been discarded in some juris-
dictions.'42 However, most American jurisdictions still retain
some form of the marital rape exemption,'43 even when it is no
longer logically related to the offense.' A number of juris-
dictions have extended the spousal exemption to include cohabi-
tants, which is at least consistent with the consent justification for
139. See Lucy Reed Harris, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 613 (1976).
140. HALE, supra note 36, at 629 ("[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed
by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."). See
also People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572-73 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984), and authorities cited
therein. In Liberta, the New York Court of Appeals noted that "[i]nterestingly, Hale's
statement of [the marital exemption] has not been fully accepted in England." Id. at 572 n.4
(citation omitted). 1
141. Cf. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARmS 430 (1966)).
142. Liberia, 474 N.E.2d 567; FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 163-66; West, supra
note 27, at 46. See generally DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES (1985); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990)."
143. West, supra note 27, at 46. Many of these states no longer protect a husband if the
couple lives apart under a decree of separation, or if one of the spouses has filed for separate
maintenance or divorce. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10 (McKinney 1988); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.5201 (1975).
144. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b to .520e (1975) (This law which became
effective April 1, 1975, omitted terms or concepts of consent, yet retained the spousal excep-
tion in the sexual conduct statute).
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the marital exemption.145  More startlingly, a few jurisdictions
have extended the spousal exemption to formerly married per-
sons."4 Neither traditional justification for the spousal exemption
explains this extension, but the stereotypes which suggest that if a
woman has consented before, she will always consent again, that
women can only be raped by strangers, and that women really
enjoy rape, do appear to explain it.
5. Prompt Complaint. -For centuries it was "assumed" that
women "naturally" report rapes as soon as possible.1 47  This
assumption failed to account for evidence from women themselves
that there were numerous reasons why women do not report rape
promptly,148 including the shame attached to any sexual activity
outside of marriage, society's propensity to blame the victim for
provoking the assault by her behavior or appearance,"' a desire
to forget about the traumatic experience, 5 ° fear of public probing
into her prior sexual history,151 and fear of retribution from a
known assailant who has already shown his willingness to resort to
violence or other coercion.
151
Lord Hale, and many of his followers, believed that a court
and jury should draw a strong inference of false or feigned
testimony if a rape complainant "made no outcry" at the time of
145. West, supra note 27, at 48, n.11; see also HALE, supra note 36, at 628.
146. West, supra note 27, at 46-48, nn. 1, 5-11; see also FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26,
at 164-66, 194-96.
147. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1135 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
148. Cf Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992) (noting that the delay
by victims of domestic violence in reporting abuse is consistently interpreted within legal
system as an indication of slight credibility).
149. MARSH ET AL., supra note 87, at 89.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id. at 77. One Michigan prosecutor interviewed by the authors asserted that only
after enactment of the state's rape victim shield statute would "a married woman [who] sees
hbrself as respectable, but ... may have a skeleton in [her] closet ... bring charges." Id.
152. Dr. Pauline Bart, co-author of STOPPING RAPE: SUCCESSFUL SURVIVAL
STtATEGIES, supra note 26, and numerous other studies of rape victims and their assailants,
abandoned plans in 1990 to conduct a study of men accused of sexual assault by women
admitted to a South Side Chicago hospital emergency room for treatment because none of
the women would cooperate. All of the women that she spoke with were afraid of retali-
ation by their attackers, almost all of whom lived in the same neighborhoods with, and were
known to, their victims. Interview with Pauline Bart, Professor of Sociology, University of
Illinois in Chicago, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 16, 1991). See also MARSH ET AL., supra note
87, at 26, 89.
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the alleged assault or as soon thereafter as possible. 53 More
recently, some jurisdictions have required the prosecution to prove
that the complainant reported the rape to the police within a
specific time, such as three or six months, following the alleged
attack. Hence, the "recent complaint" requirement functioned as a
short statute of limitations.154
The original doctrine of prompt complaint is an example of
special evidentiary rules, applicable only in rape cases, which are at
odds with the evidentiary principles developed to protect the
integrity of the trial process. Requiring a prompt complaint is
contrary to the general rule that prior consistent statements are
inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted155 and that
witness assertions "are to be regarded in general as true until there
is some particular reason for impeaching them as false." '156
Generally, it is only after a witness' testimony is impeached upon
cross-examination that prior consistent statements, such as prompt
complaints to the police following an alleged rape, become
admissible, and then solely to rehabilitate the credibility of the
witness' primary testimony not for the purpose of proving the truth
of that testimony.157
Thus, under the usual rule, a complaining witness normally
would not be permitted to testify that she had made an immediate
complaint to the police unless the defendant had first presented
evidence to the jury that no rape had occurred. In common law
rape trials, however, the courts required the trier of fact to draw an
adverse inference regarding the complainant's credibility from
either the absence of a recent complaint or its inadmissibility
without regard to whether her credibility had been impeached.5 8
153. HALE, supra note 36, at 633. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) cmt. 5 (1980).
154. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4); § 213.6(4) cmt. 5 (1980).
155. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Out-of-
court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are generally defined as
"hearsay," and are admissible evidence only under specific exception to the general
exclusionary rule. Id. § 246. Such a prior consistent statement would be deemed hearsay
unless the offer of proof were specifically made for some purpose other than to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Id. § 249. Such statements were also considered unreliable
because they were "self-serving." Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 668 (L'Heureux-Dube, J.,
dissenting).
156. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 668 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting)(quoting CROSS
ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. 1990)).
157. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, § 47.
158. See 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1970), and cases collected
therein; 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940) and cases collected therein.
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However, in some jurisdictions other rules restricted the
admissibility of the prosecutor's evidence of the complainant's prior
complaint.159 When admissible, the prosecution's evidence was
not admitted to show the truth of the complainant's testimony
about the rape, but only to show that her testimony was consistent
with the prompt complaint required by law."6 This limitation is
consistent with the general rules of hearsay admissibility as outlined
above.
Like the doctrines that "mere words" are not enough to
indicate nonconsent and that reluctant consent is good consent, the
traditional prompt complaint requirement has in practice helped
men gain sexual access to more women (i.e., women who do not
wish to grant that access but can be coerced into granting it and
then shamed into silence) rather than helping women protect the
privacy and integrity of their own bodies and psyches.161 Nor has
the prompt complaint doctrine helped insure that sexual intercourse
is indeed consented to by both parties, as legal theory and social
mores ostensibly require.
6. Corroboration Requirement. -The corroboration rule for
rape complainants was another exception to traditional rules of
evidence. Generally, "the court may act upon the uncorroborated
testimony of one witness, and such requirements as there are
concerning a plurality of witnesses, or some other confirmation of
individual testimony are exceptional. 1 62 The standard exceptions
have long been children of tender years, accomplices and rape
complainants, all of whom were thought to be especially unreliable
as witnesses. 163  The reliability of children of tender years was
apparently doubted because of questions about capacity, and that
of accomplices doubted because of conflicts of interests created by
their complicity in the crime that the defendant is accused of
committing. That rape complainants are included in this list seems
best explained by the stereotypical concerns with women's
"complicity" in rape and fabricated rape charges.
159. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 668 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 359 (1993)(discussing sexual violation as an aspect of women's subordination).
162. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 668 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting) (quoting CROSS
ON EVIDENCE 224 (7th ed. 1990)).
163. Id.
[Vol. 100:4
DIVERSITY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
7. Prior Sexual History and Relevance. -Prior sexual history
of a rape complainant should be considered "character evidence"
since its predominant effect is to impugn the complainant's
character." 4 Under established rules of evidence, support for a
fact is not admissible for any purpose unless it is shown to be
relevant to the proposition sought to be established. 65 Tradition-
ally there are several overlapping ways to establish relevance
between proffered evidence and the fact to be established: (1)
showing a connection that "accords with common sense"; 6 (2)
showing a probable connection in common experience; 167 and (3)
showing that the evidence is "logically probative" of the fact to be
established, i.e., it makes that fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."6
At common law evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
history (or "unchasteness") with respect to both the defendant and
other men was admissible for the purpose of showing both the
woman's consent and her lack of credibility. 69 In fact, however,
there is no real connection between prior sexual conduct and either
consent or credibility, as shown below. The assumption that the
complainant's prior sexual history is relevant for these two
purposes relies on one or more of the assumptions or stereotypes
listed above, mainly that "unchaste" women consent to intercourse
indiscriminately and that "unchaste" women lie.t7° In particular,
these stereotypes assume that women with a history of prior
extramarital sexual relations are neither nice nor truthful.
Whatever may have been the accuracy of these assumptions two
hundred or one hundred years ago,171 social science research since
164. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., FED. R. EvD. 401, 402.
166. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 679 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
167. FED. R. EviD. 401; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, § (185
(whether evidence is relevant ordinarily lies "in the judge's own experience, his general
knowledge, and his understanding of human conduct and motivation"); Abraham P. Ordover,
Admissability of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death ofCharacterfor
Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 105-08 (1977).
168. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 679 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
169. Such evidence was deemed relevant even if the accused had been unaware of the
complainant's prior sexual history, making it clear that the relevance pertained to the truth
of her complaint, not to the defendant's state of mind.
170. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 679 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
171. This is not to imply that these stereotypes were accurate in the past. Yet current
social science research cannot tell us whether they were accurate in the past and, in any case,
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the mid-1960s and the actual conduct of the general population in
the United States and Canada have certainly discredited these
stereotypes for today. For example, a study of sexual behavior
published in 1974 reported that 80 percent of all women engaged
in sexual relations prior to marriage, 72 almost 80 percent of men
believe that premarital sex is appropriate for unengaged women
and over 80 percent of men accept it as appropriate for engaged
women.173 Yet, many legislators, judges and commentators have
continued to assume that prior sexual history evidence is relevant
at least to the issue of consent.1 74
In any event, not all relevant evidence is admissible under
general evidentiary principles. Relevant evidence may be
unreliable or too prejudicial to the truth-finding function of the
judicial system or too likely to cause confusion of the issues. Thus,
evidence which is logically relevant but highly prejudicial or likely
to lead to jury confusion may and sometimes should be excluded
under general evidentiary principles unless its probative value is
particularly great.'75
In the past two decades, research conducted in response to
women's concerns has assessed actual jury verdicts and prospective
jurors' reactions to hypothetical rape scenarios and cases. This
research has established beyond cavil the highly prejudicial nature
of prior sexual history evidence. For example, one study examined
the impact that prior sexual history evidence, under three types of
whether they were is irrelevant to the issue of whether they are appropriate to use as
standards within the legal system today.
172. MORTON HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 150 (1974).
173. Id. at 116, Table 13.
174. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2); Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 612-21 (there is "no
logical or practical link between a woman's sexual reputation and whether she is a truthful
witness," but exclusion of prior sexual history evidence without permitting the judge to weigh
its relevance to consent against possible prejudice is unconstitutional); Frederick Eisenbud,
Comment, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual
History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflections of Reality or Denial
of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L REV. 403, 409 n.28 (1975).
The Model Penal Code does not address the issues raised by prior sexual history
evidence. However, the Revised Comments to the Official Draft suggest that while the
complainant's prior sexual history is relevant to the issue of consent, "[o]bviously, veracity
and sexual restraint are not related in any.dependable fashion." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1 cmt. 8(e) (1980).
175. CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
438-40 (2d ed. 1972).
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exclusionary rules, had on prospective jurors.176  The study
showed that only the most restrictive evidentiary rule curtailed the
jury's inference of victim consent, enhanced the complainant's
credibility and increased the likelihood of conviction.177 Restric-
tion of such evidence did not, however, increase the likelihood of
conviction where the facts of the hypothetical case included prior
close friendship between the defendant and complainant which was
accompanied by physical affection. 17 8  Even prior to such re-
search, however, defense lawyers have always exploited this
prejudice. Indeed, as a member of the Canadian House of
Commons testified during the 1975 debate to reform Canada's rape
laws:
The myth is that a "bad woman" is incapable of being raped.
... We have to deal with the myth that the credibility of a "bad
woman" is immediately in question. I was never sure what that
phrase meant. As a lawyer, all I knew was that it was of
benefit to hurl as much dirt as possible in the direction of such
a woman, hoping that some of it would stick and that the jury
would disbelieve what she said.179
8. Prior Sexual History and Consent. -The principle that
logically relevant evidence which is either highly prejudicial or
likely to lead to jury confusion should be excluded has been
applied generally to exclude evidence of a criminal defendant's
character or of his or her "propensity" to commit a certain crime.
The Federal Rules of Evidence codified this common law rule in
1974: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion."" s  Such evidence
may not be offered to suggest that a defendant acted in a specific
176. The three types of evidentiary rules on which the study was based were: (1) no
exclusion-all prior sexual history evidence admissible for any purpose; (2) general exclusion
of third party prior sexual history unless the judge specifically determined the evidence to
be material to a fact in issue; and (3) exclusion of most third party prior sexual history
evidence because of the risk of prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.
Borgida & White, supra note 26, at 342.
177. Id. at 345-346.
178. Id. at 342.
179. House of Commons Debate (Nov. 19,1975, at 9252)(statement of Mr. Jarvis) quoted
in Seaboyer v. Queen, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 694 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting)(emphasis
omitted). See also Sheehy, supra note 64, at 774-75.




way on an occasion other than the one for which the evidence is
proffered."'
Yet, from the early common law through the Federal Rules of
Evidence, special rules have permitted evidence of a complainant's
"unchaste" character to prove her consent in a rape trial.1" To
justify this exception proponents analogize it to the exception
allowing certain character evidence where a murder or assault
defendant claims that the victim was the first aggressor. Still, under
that exception, the defendant may only offer evidence that the
victim has a "character of turbulence and violence., 183  The
defendant is not permitted to offer evidence of specific past acts of
violence.l 4
While a rape complainant is not the defendant and therefore
protective rules adopted for the defendant are not necessarily
appropriate, this general rule applies more broadly than simply with
respect to criminal defendants' propensities to commit crimes.
Experience has shown the same or even greater distorting prejudice
to the prosecution's case if a complainant's prior sexual history is
introduced. Concern with jury confusion and with prejudice that
might preyent a fair, unbiased outcome are the same for both types
of cases. Notwithstanding the criminal justice system's concern
with protecting innocent defendants, a defendant is entitled only to
a fair trial, not to a trial prejudiced in his or her favor.
One subcategory of prior sexual history evidence traditionally
viewed as particularly relevant is the so-called "pattern of conduct
evidence." '185 This is evidence that prior sexual activity of the
complainant shows a pattern of conduct similar to the conduct
alleged in the, case at bar. Proponents suggest that the prior
conduct is highly indicative of the fact that the complainant
consented to the alleged sexual assault and that nonconsent is a
181. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, §§ 188, 192
(even in civil cases where commission of a crime is in issue, evidence of character is barred
for purpose of showing "how a person probably acted on a particular occasion"); Ordover,
supra note 167, at 108; see also FED. R. EvID. 404(b), 404(b) advisory committee's note.
182. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2); 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 (3d ed. 1940); Ordover,
supra note 167, at 108-09;
183. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, § 193.
184. Id.
185. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State.and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 830-48 (1986); Ordover, supra note
167, at 115-18.
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separate element of the crime."8 6 In her dissent in Seaboyer,
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube pointed out that such evidence
is "nothing more than a prohibited propensity argument" which is
"highly prejudicial to the integrity and fairness of the trial pro-
cess."'" As Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube reasoned:
Such arguments depend for their vitality on the notion that
women consent to sex based upon such extraneous consider-
ations as the location of the act, the race, age or profession of
the alleged assaulter and/or considerations of the nature of the
sexual act engaged in. Though it feels somewhat odd to have
to state this next proposition explicitly, consent is to a person
and not to a circumstance. The use of the words "pattern" and
"similar fact" deny this reality. Such arguments are implicitly
based upon the notion that women will, in the right circum-
stances, consent to anyone and, more fundamentally, that
"unchaste" women have a propensity to consent. ... In my
view, the mythical bases of these arguments deny their rele-
vance.1 s
Stated even more bluntly, the "propensity" and "pattern of
conduct evidence" are both thinly disguised suggestions that a
woman who has, even a few times, engaged in sex outside marriage
must be a whore.
Another subcategory of prior sexual history evidence admitted
to prove consent involves prior sexual relationships between the
complainant and the defendant. Such evidence is still admissible
under most post-reform statutes that generally bar prior sexual
history evidence because most legislators still believe it is highly
relevant to the question of the complainant's consent. Such laws
thereby endorse the stereotypical attitude that if the defendant and
complainant were acquainted prior to the encounter, the complain-
186. MCCORMICK supra note 155, at §§ 186, 190 (character evidence generally is not
admissible except when character is in issue or when it is relevant to prove something more
specific than that a person has acted in conformity with their past behavior). As we shall
see, since the 1970's prior sexual history is generally excluded in most states under so-called
"rape shield" laws, which require a showing of special necessity.
187. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 685 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 685-86. See also Kearse v. State, 88 S.W. 363, 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1905)
(testimony by defense witness that he had kissed the complainant was properly excluded
because "the fact [she] may have kissed the witness ... would be no argument that she
would kiss appellant"). But see KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992) (a




ant was more likely to have consented than not.189 As noted
above, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube has observed that
"consent is to a person and not to a circumstance."'" One might
also observe that consent is to a person in the context of a relation-
ship as it exists at a particular point in time, and not to that person
forever and under all circumstances.19' As expressed in the
Revised Comments to the Model Penal Code: "[O]f course, a
woman's freedom of choice is hers to exercise from time to time as
she thinks fit.'
192
9. Prior Sexual History and Credibility. -The final area of
evidentiary doctrine that has struck many women lawyers and other
advocates for rape victims as unbalanced and prejudicial is the use
of evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history to impeach
her credibility at trial.
1 93
In the English common law tradition, counsel was permitted to
inquire, for purposes of impeaching a witness' credibility, into the
personal history and conduct tending to discredit the character of
the witness so long as it had not provided the basis for a criminal
conviction.1 94 This rule was frequently disputed in the United
States, with widely varying results, but most American courts came
to limit cross-examination attacking character "to acts which have
a significant relation to the credibility of the witness."' 95  The
Federal Rules of Evidence takes this approach.196  Conduct
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 2 at 280 (1980) (criterion of "prior
companionship" reduces degree of offense because "[i]ts presence reduces confidence in the
conclusion of aggression and nonconsent, and seems relevant as well to the degree of injury
inflicted and the general dangerousness of the actor." (emphasis added)).
190. Seaboyer, [1991]. 2 S.C.R. at 685 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting)(commenting on
the relevance of a complainant's prior sexual history in general).
191. Cf. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984); West, supra note 27, at
64-65.
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(e) (1980).
193. See generally Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to Women's Credibility: a Feminist
Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327 (1993) (exploring how the male
dominated legal system perpetuates the subordination of women by promoting disbelief in
women's stories of rape).
194. 3A WiGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 983-986 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
195. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, § 41.
196. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides in part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the
court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness
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satisfying this standard should involve dishonesty, misrepresentation
or other false statement, e.g., forgery, suppression of evidence, false
pretenses, cheating or embezzlement, 197 perjury or subornation of
perjury,Igs lying on government applications,'99 or deceptive
practices.2" Under this rule, evidence of other "bad acts" is not
generally admissible for the purpose of impeaching credibility,2"'
as it was in England." 2
However, until the 1970s evidence of a rape complainant's
prior sexual acts with men other than her husband continued to be
deemed relevant to, and therefore admissible to impeach, her
credibility. Thus, her sexual history or "chasteness" was
directly equated with a propensity to lie, at least about sexual
matters. While this rule may have been developed during the
ascendance of Puritanism2 in English society and would be
logical for the time in which it was developed, it is not applied
uniformly to men and women in all criminal trials.20 5 Nor is the
rationale rational in the context of modem mores. Evidence of the
prior sexual history of an accused not resulting in conviction for a
crime was inadmissible because it was deemed to be too prejudi-
cial.20 6
or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthness
of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
testified.
Id. This rule was based on one originally prescribed by the Supreme Court. See JON R.
WALTZ, THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 92-93 (2d ed. 1975).
197. United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987).
198. United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1987).
199. United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987).
200. United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
201. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, § 41.
202. Id. § 41 n.31 and cases cited therein. At the other extreme, a few courts prohibit all
such evidence. Id. n.32.
203. E.g., State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895); Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 667
(L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
204. THE PURITAN REVOLUTION ix-xxii (Stuart E. Prall ed., 1968). Matthew Hale was
greatly influenced by the Calvinist belief-system of the Puritans, by whom he was trained in
his youth. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden,
Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1703-05, 1722 (1994).
205. Sibley, 33 S.W. at 171; Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 667 (L'Heureux-Dube, J.,
dissenting).
206. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, § 42 at 144 (only crimes punishable
by death or imprisonment exceeding one year could be used against a criminal defendant,
and then only if the court determines that the probative value of the conviction outweighs
its prejudicial effect on the defendant).
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A 1980 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada2' on this
subject illustrates the difficulty of changing the framework through
which traditional rules and rationales are viewed. Because the
credibility of a non-party witness is a collateral issue, general rules
of evidence permit questioning a complainant about specific
instances of sexual activity with men other than the defendant
(assuming prior sexual history is deemed relevant), although no
extrinsic evidence could be offered to contradict her denial of such
activity.2"8 Under the common law, this rule permitted virtually
unlimited inquiry into a complainant's prior sexual history. In
Canada, a "rape shield" statute was enacted in 1976209 to restrict
such fishing expeditions, which greatly contributed to rape
complainants' feelings that they, rather than the accused, were on
trial. The constitutionality of the statute was challenged before the
Supreme Court of Canada in Forsythe v. The Queen.21" A majori-
ty of the Court decided that Parliament must have intended to
"balance" the explicit new "protection" afforded the complainant
with unstated new rights for the defendant.2 It Consequently, the
Supreme Court held that the defendant could compel the complain-
ant's testimony on his behalf at the required in camera hearing.
Furthermore, if cross-examination of the complainant with respect
to specific sexual activity with other men were permitted at trial,
In a significant shift, new Federal Rule of Evidence 413, permitting consideration of
evidence of similar crimes by a defendant in sexual assault cases, was adopted in 1994 along
with new rules permitting similar evidence in cases involving child molestation. See FED. R.
EVID. 413, 414, 415. Both parts of this reform appear to be attributable to the increased
public concern about repeat child molesters.
207. Forsythe v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 268 (Can.). At the time of this decision,
seven men and no women sat on the Canadian Supreme Court. JAMES G. SNELL &
FREDERICK VAUGHAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTION
app. (1985).
208. See, e.g., State v. Bowman, 61 S.E.2d 107 (N.C. 1950); Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at
672 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 155, §§ 41, 49;
3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 979 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
209. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, § 8, codified at CRIM.
CODE CAN., R.S.C. (1975), c. C-34 § 142. The statute provided that a complainant could not
be questioned as to her sexual conduct with a third party unless notice of such questions and
the evidence sought to be adduced was given to the prosecutor and the court determined,
following an in camera hearing, that "the weight of the evidence is such that to exclude it
would prevent the making of a just determination of an issue of fact in the proceedings,
including the credibility of the complainant." Seaboyer, [19911 2 S.C.R. at 670 (L'Heureux-
Dube, J., dissenting).
210. Forsythe, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 268.
211. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 672-73 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting); Forsythe,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. at 274, 276.
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the defendant could call other witnesses solely for the purpose of
impugning her credibility.212 Thus, the complainant's credibility
was elevated by the court from a collateral to a material issue.213
As pointed out by the dissenting justices in Seaboyer, the Forsythe
decision retipped the balance of justice back toward the accused,
when Canada's legislature had tried to eliminate the undue




Whenever legal rules explicitly give the judge "discretion" over
an issue, an opportunity to insert and act on biases and personal
values is created.215 Situations in which a judge may exercise
discretion include deciding admissibility of evidence- especially
evidence related to a complainant's prior sexual history, ruling on
other types of motions, "leading" jurors through the judge's
demeanor and other subtle behavior, and instructions to the
jury.216 In most states, prior to the reforms brought about in the
1970s, judges decided whether specific instances of the com-
plainant's prior sexual conduct with men other than the accused
were admissible for purposes of either showing her propensity to
engage in extramarital sex 217 or impeaching her credibility.
218
In some states the judge's discretion determined whether a defen-
dant's request for a psychiatric examination of the complainant
212. Forsythe, [1980] 2 S.C.R. at 274-75.
213. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 671 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting); Forsythe, [1980]
2 S.C.R. at 274-75.
214. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 672-73 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting). The Canadian
Parliament responded to the Forsythe decision by enacting the statute declared unconsti-
tutional in Seaboyer. Id. at 674-78.
215. See generally Lisa A. Binder, 'With More than Admiration He Admired': Images of
Beauty and Defilement in Judicial Narratives of Rape, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 265 (1995);
see also Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in
Sexual Assault Trials, 32 SOC. PROB. 389, 393 (1985); Scheppele, supra note 124, at 1104-05.
216. MARSH ET AL., supra note 87, at 58-59. The authors report an instance after
enactment of Michigan's landmark reformed sexual assault statute in 1975 where the judge
granted the defense attorney's request for a jury instruction that consent was implied because
the complainant did not scream when she was attacked. Id.
217. 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev. 1983).
218. 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Judicial discretion is
still crucial for determining the admissibility of prior sexual history evidence under many
reform statutes that generally exclude such evidence. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122,
at 164-65; Ordover, supra note 167, at 120.
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would be granted and the results of the examination used for
impeachment purposes.219
The institutional pressures on judges to avoid reversal are
significant. If the defendant is convicted, the judge may be
reversed by an appellate court for failure to provide the defendant
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and her testimony or
for failure to admit evidence arguably favorable to the defendant.
However, the state may not appeal an acquittal. A judge may
therefore feel it is safer and easier for everyone (except the
complainant) to admit any proffered evidence on the complainant's
sexual history or other matters of reputation. That way the judge
need not worry about reversal on appeal.2" The need to separate
the effects of such institutional pressures from the effects of judges'
stereotypical view of rape victims make the social science research
cited throughout this paper essential.
The jury exercises similar discretion when it decides whether
the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a complainant
was coerced by the defendant's greater size and weight to acquiesce
in sexual intercourse.
Some of this discretion, particularly that exercised by the jury,
is unavoidable. However, in many jurisdictions the courts'
discretion concerning admissible evidence has been limited by
exclusionary rules such as rape victim shield laws adopted by either
the legislature or the jurisdiction's highest court.22
E. Individual Redefinitions of the Offense
A male view of reality can also distort the search for truth in
rape prosecutions when police, prosecutors and juries substitute
their own ideas of what constitutes "real rape" for the offenses
proscribed by the legislature. A number of reformers and social
science analysts have explored the exercise of discretion by police
in making "founded" or "unfounded" decisions about sexual assault
219. 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a n.1 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
220. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 102, citing S. Mathiasen, The Rape Victin" A
Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 36 (1974).
221. But see Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 630-36 (noting that the statute, which barred the
defendant from introducing evidence of complainant's sexual activity with other persons
except for limited purposes and after the judge has determined in a closed hearing that the
evidence serves the stated purpose, was declared invalid under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court established "guidelines" based on Professor
Harriet Galvin's 1986 article; see Galvin, supra note 185).
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reports and by prosecutors in deciding whether to issue arrest
warrants and prosecute alleged assailants.2" In both circumstanc-
es, stereotypes and related attitudes about the complainant's
culpability held by criminal justice personnel can and often do
override even explicit definitions of sexual assault crimes.2"
Similar transformations occur in the jury room. One study of
jurors who had served in rape trials in Indianapolis, Indiana
explored whether the jurors were influenced by their views of
women's role in society or by evidence submitted at trial concern-
ing the complainant's "bad character," i.e., any evidence that the
complainant drank or used drugs, engaged in sexual activity outside
marriage, or had met the defendant in a bar or hitchhiking.224
The study revealed that whenever the defense questioned the
complainant's status as a victim by claiming that she had consented
or that intercourse never took place, any "bad character" evidence
tended to increase the likelihood that the jurors who held tradition-
al sex-role stereotypes would acquit the defendant.2" Even when
the defendant's defense did not involve the complainant's status as
a victim (i.e., when the defendant claimed that the rape was
committed by someone else or that his own insanity or intoxication
had diminished his responsibility for his actions), sex-role conserva-
tive jurors were still more likely to consider the defendant innocent
if evidence of the complainant's "bad character" was offered. 22
On the other hand, evidence that the defendant had used a weapon
or that the complainant was injured would appear highly probative
of the complainant's forced submission to sexual intercourse against
her will. Yet such evidence did not significantly affect the jurors'
judgement, even where the complainant's status as a victim was at
227issue.
Various studies, supported by extensive anecdotal evidence,
have also shown that most prospective jurors believe acquaintance
rape is relatively rare 2' despite the fact that crime statistics229
222. LaFree et al., supra note 215, at 393.
223. See generally, MARSH ET AL., supra note 87, at 85-104.
224. LaFree et al., supra note 215, at 397-99.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 399.
227. Id. at 397; see also BOURQUE, supra note 45, at 199; FEILD & BIENEN, supra note
26, at 119.
228. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 76; KATZ & MAZUR, supra note 35, at 205-14.
229. MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS OF FORCIBLE RAPE 229-52 (1971); KATZ & MAZUR,
supra note 35, at 115; UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 57.
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and social science research23 ° indicate the contrary. Jurors remain
more likely to infer consent whenever the complainant and
defendant were acquainted prior to the alleged sexual assault."1
This is true even where the acquaintance was brief and did not
indicate "bad character" in the sense that meeting in a bar or
hitchhiking might be considered, under certain moral codes, to
indicate questionable character. One study even showed that
evidence of prior acquaintance resulted in a lower conviction rate
at trials where the main defense was mistaken identity, despite the
logical conclusion that the victim's prior acquaintance would have
rendered her identification more credible.232
These studies are consistent with claims of feminists and
female college students that date rape is widespread and, until very
recently, not taken seriously. 3 Crime statistics obviously do not
explain these attitudes. The stereotypical views that a woman
cannot be raped against her will, that "real rape" involves strang-
ers, and that claims of acquaintance rape are largely fabricated do
explain the failure of society and the criminal justice system to deal
seriously with rapes committed by acquaintances.
These and other studies reveal that jurors' decisions in rape
trials are consistently affected by information which is irrelevant to
legal definitions of rape. Factors such as thedefendant's race, the
complainants' race, the combination of their races; 234 whether the
230. See supra note 26.
231. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 4, 76-78; LaFree et al., supra note 215, at 397-
99.
232. LaFree et al., supra note 215, at 399.
233. E.g., ESTRICH, supra note 25, at 12-13; Collison, supra note 114, at Al.
234. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 79-80, 102, 106-07, 116-19, 125-28. Half of the
prospective jurors in Feild and Bienen's study believed that rape occurs primarily between
black men and white women. Id. at 80. The prospective jurors were prepared to punish
black men whom they believed had raped white women more severely than guilty white
defendants or black defendants believed to have raped black women. Id. at 118. In fact,
statistics show that 78 percent of all rapes involve black victims and black offenders, 16
percent involve white victims and white offenders, and only 4 percent involve white victims
and black offenders. See AMIR, supra note 229, at 44. The remaining 2 percent must include
rapes involving black victims and white offenders and all other interracial or intraracial rapes.
The problem with the statistics, of course, is that they represent only those rapes where the
victim reported the incident, the police pursued the evidence, the prosecutor indicted and the
jury convicted. Such statistics have little to tell us about the actual frequency of rape within
ethnic groups. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 3(a) (1980); see generally CHARLES
HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM (1976).
Because 94 percent of rapes involved an offender and a victim of the same race,
prosecutors tend to want evidence that a particular offender and victim were of different
races to show the lack of probability of consent. Relying on such evidence ignores the bias
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complainant drinks or has used drugs; whether she is a runaway
teenager, unemployed, separated, divorced or living in a common
law relationship; 5 and whether the complainant and defendant
knew each other, or even had just met and engaged in a brief
conversation, were all significant factors determining trial outcomes,
regardless of the specific legal issues raised at trial. The factors
involving prior sexual history were precisely the kind traditionally
permitted by special evidentiary rules.
These jury studies make it clear that many of the myths or
stereotypes about rape have been and continue to be held by
women who have assimilated a high degree of sex role stereotyping
into their reasoning process. 6  Indeed, most people label the
male perspective the "traditional" view of sex roles in our society.
However, it seems safe to conclude that these stereotypes did not
originate with women. As we have seen, many stereotypes were
implicit in Lord Hale's treatment of rape. In the seventeenth
century women did not participate in the legal system or in any
other socially influential institutions. As numerous feminist
histories have made abundantly clear, that has remained largely
true until very recently.7 Furthermore, men are significantly
more accepting of rape myths and violence against women than are
women. 8  Therefore, whoever may express or act upon these
stereotypes in specific instances, the stereotypes themselves clearly
reflect a partial view of reality that fails to account fully for
women's experiences."
While the male-oriented rules governing common law rape
trials were developed by lawyers (often with the conscious purpose
of favoring male defendants), the male-oriented presuppositions
underlying many of these rules originated as general cultural
assumptions. However, once such a set of biased or "perspectived"
assumptions have been taken into the structure of a cultural insti-
tution like the legal system, it rarely vanishes or withers away of its
own accord. Biased assumptions must be identified, articulated and
in the statistics and the high probability of prejudice against either a black accused or a black
complainant.
235. Clark & Lewis, supra note 54.
236. See Check & Malamuth, supra note 26, at 345.
237. See generally, 1 & 2 BONNIE S. ANDERSON & JUDITH P. ZINSSER, A HISTORY OF
THEIR OWN: WOMEN IN EUROPE FROM PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT (1988).
238. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 50-53; Check & Malamuth, supra note 26, at 347.
239. West, supra note 12, passim.
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
debated. Since all institutions are inherently self-conserving and
therefore heavily weighted more toward inertia than change,
forceful advocacy is required to eliminate, modify or ameliorate
such biased perspectives.
III.. The Women's Movement and Statutory Rape Reform
A. Achieving Statutory Reform
In the mid-1970s the women's movement, coupled with women
who had entered the legal profession, joined law and order groups
and other traditional political organizations such as the League of
Women Voters and the American Civil Liberties Union to create
a strong tide of rape law reform in state legislatures across the
United States.2" Due to the varying characteristics of voter and
legislator populations, each statute represents a balance of local
compromises between reformer pressures and legislative percep-
tions of the desirability and popularity of reform.24'
By 1985, England, Canada, and almost all American jurisdic-
tions, including the federal courts,242 had enacted "rape shield
laws" that exclude some or most evidence of a complainant's prior
sexual history from admission at trial.243 The remaining states
adopted similar bars by judicial decision.244  Many jurisdictions
also enacted statutory definitions of rape or sexual assault that
emphasize the use of force or coercion by the attacker and
eliminate either all mention of the complainant's resistance or at
least the requirement of "utmost resistance." A few states even
eliminated any express reference to the complainant's lack of
consent as an element of the offense.245
Many of the new statutes also eliminated the term "rape" and
defined a range of criminal conduct denoted as different degrees of
240. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 188 n.3. As of 1992, all major jurisdictions had
effected rape law reforms, most through legislation and a few solely through case law. SPOHN
& HORNEY, supra note 122, at 81. Many of the new statutes had been preceded by signifi-
cant decisional reforms. Id. at 80.
241. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 153-54.
242. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
243. See 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62, 1264 n.l (Tillers rev. 1983); David Haxton,
Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of
Evidence, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20.
244. See 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 n.12 (Tillers rev. 1983); State ex. rel. Pope v.
Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976).
245. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b-520e (1991); 2C N.J.S.A. § 14 (1979 &
Supp. 1996).
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sexual assault or criminal sexual conduct bearing different degrees
of punishment.2" Prior to these reforms the common law offense
of rape generally carried a penalty ranging from execution and life
imprisonment to 20 years imprisonment. Experience had shown
that, because of the severity of these penalties, many juries were
unwilling to convict defendants for any rape other than those
involving aggravated assault and serious injury247 or rapes of
white women by black men.24 Consequently, at the request of
women's advocates and law and order groups, the new penalties
prescribed for the degree of sexual assault most nearly equivalent
to the common law offense of rape were reduced in the hope that
more convictions would result.249
The definition of rape and the special evidentiary rules
formulated for rape trials had not been widely questioned until the
early 1970s. Why did this happen after so many centuries? The
women's movement of the 1960s was clearly a key factor prompting
the reform movement of the 1970s. For the first time, a relatively
large number of women were examining issues that affect women
in unique ways. As a result, women began to demand the political
and structural changes in society necessary to eliminate gender bias
from the discussion and resolution of those issues.
2 °
Another key factor prompting the rape reform of the 1970s
appears to have been the influx of a "critical mass" of women into
the legal profession, women who were knowledgeable about the
doctrine of rape and the rules applied to rape prosecutions. The
percentage of women in the legal profession had remained constant
246. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 26, at 155-156; see MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b-
520e.
247. MODEL PENAL CODE § 231.1 cmt. 4a (1980).
248. See supra note 234.
249. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1(1); § 213.1 cmt.2 (1980).
250. See Fineman, supra note 10; Jennifer Nedelsky, The Practical Possibilities of Feminist
Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1286 (1993). For some of the practical consequences of greater
participation by women in the legal profession, see MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS:
REWRITING THE RULES (1994) and JUDITH G. GREENBERG, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES:
INFLUENCING LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES (1993).
Women lawyers also played important roles as legislators, even though their numbers
have remained relatively low in Congress and most states. For example, the "primary
sponsor" and "architect" of the rape shield provision added to the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1978 was Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D. N.Y.). See 124 CONG. REC. 11944
(1978)(statement of Rep. James R. Mann).
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at around 2 to 3 percent for several decades prior to 1970.51
These numbers grew from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 12.8 percent in
1980,2 19.3 percent in 19892 3 and 22 percent in 1990.2-A
This growth is reflected in law school statistics. Few women
were admitted to law school until the mid-1970s.255 In 1970 and
1976 women comprised 7.8 percent and 28.4 percent of first year
law students at a representative sample of 103 American law
schools.25 6 From 1980 through 1990 the percentage of women in
incoming classes fluctuated between 40 and 42.7 percent, climbing
to 44 percent in 1994.5 If present law school admission trends
hold, women will finally comprise 40 percent of the profession as
a whole around 2010.258
After becoming lawyers, women have not been distributed as
evenly throughout the profession. In 1980, for example, while
private practice was the principal employment setting for both men
and women, only 56 percent of women lawyers were in private
practice compared to 70 percent of men.5 9  Statistics are not
readily available detailing the number of women who have become
251. Different Voices, Different Choices? The Impact of More Women Lawyers and
Judges in the Justice System, JUDICATURE, Oct./Nov. 1980, at 138, 140 Table 2.
252. Elyce H. Zenoff & Kathryn V. Lorio, What We Know, What We Think We Know,
and What We Don't Know About Women Law Professors, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 869, 870 (1983).
253. 1990 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE U.S., Table 645 (110th
ed.). In fact, in 1989, women comprised a lower percentage of practicing lawyers and judges
than in any other profession in the United States other than dentists, clergy, engineers and
geologists. Id.
254. Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to be Part of a Perpetual
First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1988).
255. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR 101 (1986). While relatively few
women applied to law schools, they were not encouraged to attend, either by the general
culture or by the schools.
256. Zenoff & Lorio, supra note 252, at 870. See also A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 6 (1995) (hereinafter A
LOOK AT THE NUMBERS).
257. See, e.g., Ken Myers, Law Schools, NAT'L L.J. 4 (March 18, 1991); John C. Metaxas,
Law Schools, NAT'L L.J. 2 (March 16, 1987)); A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION
1, n.1 (1996).
These percentages varied widely among individual law schools, especially the "top
ten," which generally lagged these numbers considerably. For example, women were not
admitted to Harvard Law School at all until 1950, although Harvard did hire Professor Soia
Mentschikoff as a visiting professor of law from 1947 to 1949. Zenoff & Lorio, supra note
252, at 869. When New York University's enrollment of women law students reached 40
percent around 1975, it was unprecedented among the major law schools.
258. A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS, supra note 256, at 6.
259. Id. at 18-19.
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state prosecutors, the lawyers responsible for prosecuting accused
sexual offenders."6 We do know that a much higher proportion
of women than men become government lawyers of all kinds: 17
percent of women lawyers compared to only 9 percent of men.261
However, women state court judges, who would be responsible
for managing rape and other sexual assault trials, still represent
only a small proportion of trial judges in comparison to the total
percentage of women in the profession. This is in part because
judgeships presume significant professional experience. Having
entered the profession in large numbers only since the late 1970s,
women are still underrepresented as lawyers in all age groups
above 30 years of age. 62 According to the American Bar Associ-
ation Commission on Women in the Profession, women lawyers
represent 35 percent of lawyers under 30 years of age and 32
percent of the lawyers ages 30 to 34, but only 4 percent of lawyers
age 60 and above.21 Still, the age distribution does not account
for the overall discrepancy, particularly among lawyers in the lower
age groups.
21
In its 1995 statistical report the ABA Commission on Women
in the Profession reported that "[f]rom 1980 to 1991, representation
of women among state judges increased from 4% to 9%?'26s But
progress has been uneven in this context as well. "For example, in
late 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court appointed twenty-seven new
Associate Judges for Cook County, the single largest Illinois Circuit
accounting for almost 50% of all Illinois Circuit judges. None of
260. As we saw earlier, police officers stand at another crucial point in the prosecution
of sex offenders since police make initial decisions whether to investigate a complainant's
story and whether to turn the case over to a prosecutor. The inclusion of women in law
enforcement positions follows the same patterns revealed in the legal profession. For
example, when the Police Foundation conducted a study of five sizable American cities in
1972, women constituted less than .5 percent of police officers working in the field in New
York and Philadelphia and less than 2 percent in Dallas, Indianapolis and Washington D.C.
Only in the comparatively smaller cities of Miami and Peoria, Illinois did women constitute
more than 4 percent of police officers in the field. See CATHERINE MILTON, WOMEN IN
POLICING 59, 62-74, 82-83, 90-91 (1972).
261. A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS, supra note 256, at 19 (Chart 13), 32-34. This
distribution had begun to even out by 1991 but was still unbalanced. Id. It is not clear
whether women prosecutors have comprised a constant proportion of women government
lawyers of this period.
262. Id. at 13 (Chart 8).
263. Id.
264. id. at 30 (Chart 25).
265. A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS, supra note 256, at 31.
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the appointees was a woman.''266  The Commission also noted:
"At about the same time, the Illinois Supreme Court also filled
four appellate vacancies. None of the appointees was *a
woman."
267
Looking just at state courts of last resort, as of 1992 only fifty-
nine women had ever served on these courts,26 with 91 percent
having served since 1970 and almost 70 percent since 1980.269 As
of 1992, nine state courts of highest resort had never included a
woman justice,2 70 and only one such court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, had ever consisted of a majority of women.27
Significantly, a recent study of role orientations among women state
supreme court judges concluded that women state appellate judges
do tend to act as the most pro-women members of their courts
when faced with issues of special concern to women.272
As a consequence, the impact of women lawyers on the actual
prosecution of sexual offenders is still minimal. Instead, the
greatest impact has come through the scholarship of women on law
reviews and law faculties. 273  While women are similarly
underrepresented on law faculties, especially in tenured and tenure
track positions,27 the number of scholarly articles on rape, most
266. Id.
267. Id. at 54 n.26. "A spokesman for the court is reported by the Chicago Sun-Times
to have said, 'There was "no intent whatsoever" to exclude women'." Id.
268. David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and Women State Supreme
Court Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 156-57 (1993).
269. Id. at 158.
270. Id, at 156-57.
271. Id. at 162.
272. Id. at 161, 165. See also Elaine Martin, The Representative Role of Women Judges,
77 JUDICATURE 166 (1993).
273. Law faculty not only contribute the bulk of legal scholarship; they also exert the first
and perhaps the strongest influence on each new generation of lawyers. Thus, law faculty
influence their students by being role models, by the seminars and electives that they choose
to teach, and by the materials and approaches that they select to present required courses.
274. Law school teachers are typically hired to teach around five years after graduation
from law school. As such, the number of women faculty numbers should be expected to
track the percentage of women students, allowing for approximately a five year log, more
closely than the percentage of women in the profession as a whole. In fact, however, women
comprised less than 2 percent of law teachers in 1967 and less than 15 percent of all full-time
tenure track teachers in 1982. Zenoff & Lorno, supra note 252, at 780-81. In 1982, 54
percent of newly hired female law teachers received non-tenure track positions. This is in
comparison with the 28 percent of male law teachers to receive such positions. Id. at 873.
In 1983, women comprised 32 percent of clinical law teachers and 60 percent of legal
writing teachers. Yet, women held only 15.7 percent of all classroom teaching positions.
Thus, women teachers were underrepresented in the positions which are more prestigious,
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written by women, appears to have jumped far beyond the increase
in the number of law reviews published.
Thus, there is evidence that identification of the stereotypical
biases and analytical anomalies in the law of rape coincided with
the first decade in which women participated in more than token
numbers in most aspects of the legal system. Women in the 1960s
perceived intuitively and articulated the stereotypical prejudice
inherent in the prosecution of rape complaints in terms of fairness
or justice. Only in the 1970s were the doctrinal sources of the
prejudice analyzed in terms that could be translated into law
reform. The intuitions of women prompted social scientists (who
included significant numbers of women for the first time) to
conduct research which, study by study, has shown that the actual
effect of established doctrine and its application, as well as the
effect of uncodified stereotypes, have been largely at odds with the
primary goals of those who formulated the doctrine: insuring fair
trials for defendants, protecting women, enhancing public morals
and safeguarding public security.275
One attempt at rape reform did occur prior to 1970. The
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code project included work
on rape and related offenses in the 1950s. It is instructive to
compare the rape reform models of the mid-1970s with the
provisions of the draft Model Penal Code provisions on rape
submitted to the members of the American Law Institute for
discussion at their 1955 annual meeting (hereinafter referred to as
the "1955 Draft MPC").
The 1955 Draft MPC rejected traditional views in three
substantial respects. First, the 1955 Draft MPC rejected the
prevalent standard concerning a requisite showing of resistance by
the complainant. 6  The comments to Section 207.4 of the 1955
Draft MPC made clear that, in a majority of the jurisdictions sur-
veyed, the law required a showing that the complainant had
well-paid and secure. Richard H. Chused, Faculty Parenthood: Law School Treatment of
Pregnancy and Child Care, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568, 572 (1985).
275. Cf., Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence, No. 77, at 29 (Apr. 22, 1982) (Statement of the Honourable Jean Chretien,
Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada) (four basic principles underlying 1982
Canadian reforms were "the protection of the integrity of the person, the protection of
children and special groups, the safeguarding of public decency, and the elimination of sexual
discrimination") (cited in Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 675 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting)).
276. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
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resisted "to the utmost. ' 77 This formulation was also endorsed
by all of the scholarly literature cited as on point.2 8 The drafters
made clear that they were seeking to avoid any formulation under
which the complainant would need to have been "physically incapa-
ble of additional struggle against her assailant" in order for the
defendant to be convicted.279
Second, the 1955 Draft MPC adopted two standards which
better reflected differences between men and women. The first
standard imposed criminal sanctions where the complainant has
submitted to the sexual advances out of "fear" of violence,
"without requiring that the fear be reasonably grounded."28° The
drafters adopted this subjective standard with the hope of discour-
aging men from taking advantage of possibly unreasonable fears of
violence that individual women might have.21  The second
standard posited an objective "reasonable woman" standard for the
third degree of the offense, thereby providing for conviction if the
defendant compelled the complainant "to submit by any intimida-
tion"" that might "prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary
resolution.', 283  In the context of the "reasonable [male] victim"
standard generally applied at that time, this change was a signifi-
cant reform by the drafters of the 1955 Draft MPC.
Third, the kinds of effective threats which could lead to
conviction were broadened from only threats of bodily harm to the
woman, as was common under many statutes, to include threats to
her family.'
277. Id. § 207.4 cmt. 6.
278. Id. § 207.4 cmt.6 n.11 (citing I. DRUMMOND, THE SEX PARADOX 103 (1953); M.
PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 191 (1951); Dworkin, supra note 42, at 58).
279. Id. § 207.4(1) cmt. 6.
280. Id. This standard was used in only a minority of United States jurisdictions at that
time. Id. § 207.4 cmt.6 n.112.
281. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(1); § 207.4(1) cmt. 6 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
282. "Intimidation" became "threat" in the Final Draft of the Model Penal Code adopted
in 1962. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (1980).
283. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) (emphasis added).
284. Id. § 207.4(1)(a). The 1955 Draft MPC also supported conviction for first or second
degree rape for threats "to commit any felony of the first degree," e.g., a threat to murder
a friend or even a stranger, but this language was dropped from the final Model Penal Code
in 1962, making such coercive intercourse punishable as third degree gross sexual imposition
rather than as first degree rape. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(a)(2) (1980).
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In contrast, the final Model Penal Code retains a modified
version of Lord Hale's cautionary instruction285 and requires a
prompt complaint by the victim in order for a prosecution to be
brought at all (within three months of the alleged assault, reduced
from six months under the 1955 Draft MPC).286 Both the 1955
Draft MPC and the final Model Penal Code prohibit conviction for
any rape related offense classed as a felony upon the uncorrob-
orated testimony of the complainant.7 The final Model Penal
Code does make explicit that such corroboration might be
circumstantial.2" The Revised Comments, which were completed
almost twenty years after the final text of the Model Code, clarify
that corroboration is not needed for every element of the crime
alleged, as had been required in at least one state.28
The Model Penal Code continues the marital rape exemption.
The comments state that the exemption was retained on the ground
that the degree of criminal harm is less within the marriage
relationship.2l It is difficult to separate this rationale from the
old theory that a woman who marries or agrees to cohabit with a
man thereby consents to all intercourse, including that which is
coerced. The Model Code's exemption would not be available if
the couple were living apart under a decree of judicial separation
containing a non-cohabitation provision. 9 t
Finally, that male confusion between coerced and consensual
intercourse persists is demonstrated by the Model Penal Code's
reduction of the degree of the crime if the victim is or previously
had been the defendant's voluntary social companion and had ever
permitted him sexual liberties.2
285. "In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article, the jury shall be
instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in
view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth
with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private." Id. § 213.6(5) (1980).
286. Id. § 213.6(4), 213.6 cmt.5 (1980); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(5) (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1955). However, when the complainant is under sixteen or incompetent, the
complaint must be made within three months after her parent or guardian or other similarly
interested person learns of the offense.
287. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(5) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6(5) (1980).
288. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5), 213.6 cmt.6 (1980).
289. Id. § 213.6 cmt.6 (1980) (referring to old New York rule).
290. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, 207.4 cmt.4 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 213.1(1), 213.1(2), 213.6(2) (1980).
291. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (1980).
292. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980).
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Comparing these Model Penal Code provisions with the
common law of rape and the statutory reforms and feminist
scholarship of the 1970s demonstrates that it took conscientious
reform-minded men in the legal profession several centuries to
recognize even a few of the anomalies between a balanced view of
consensual sex and the traditional law of rape. These insights still
did not result in significant reform until after women began to
enter the legal profession in significant numbers. Only a few years
later, large numbers of professional and lay women identified
additional anomalies and began lobbying for change with a
significant degree of success.
The conclusion that it took women to see what even liberal,
reform-minded men at the top of the profession did not see is
compelling. Significant reform occurred after women were
admitted to law schools in significant numbers and more than a
handful of women became prosecutors, defense lawyers, legislators
and judges. These opportunities allowed women to become
knowledgeable about the details of the law and how it is analyzed
and changed. In addition, women began to engage in the analytical
work necessary to demonstrate that the doctrine and rules about
rape were not based on the same principles as other criminal
doctrines, but instead expressed stereotypes about women that
were, in the experience of most women, unwarranted. Reform
required political pressure from women as well, pressure exerted on
those with power to change the law-the still male-dominated
legislatures. Significant insight and statutory reform did not come
until both groups of people directly affected by the law of rape
became significant participants in the legal system.
B. The Effects of the 1970s Reforms
The statutory changes wrought in the 1970s and 1980s have not
had the dramatic impact on rape prosecutions that was anticipated
by the reformers. Cassia Spohn and Julie Horney recently
concluded a study of six major jurisdictions, including three where
rape law reform produced "strong" statutes2 93 and three where
the reforms were considered weak.2 94 The results indicate that
the statutory reforms had little or no impact in most of the jurisdic-
293. Michigan, Illinois and Pennsylvania. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122, at 41.
294. Washington, D.C., Georgia and Texas. Id. at 44.
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tions.295 In the three jurisdictions where the reformed laws state
explicitly that victim resistance is not "required" to prove rape,
judges and prosecutors agree that evidence of resistance is less
important for prosecution and conviction than in the other three
jurisdictions.29 6  Evidence of a previous sexual relationship
between the accused and the complainant and evidence of a
complainant's reputation for promiscuity were both considered of
less importance after the reforms in five of the six jurisdictions.
2 97
One state no longer required evidence of a prompt complaint,298
and five of the six jurisdictions eliminated the corroboration
requirement.299  Nevertheless, prompt reporting of the offense
continues to be important to obtaining convictions, and consequent-
ly continues to be important to the initial decision to prosecute.
Corroboration of the accusation, particularly by another witness,
also continues as an important influence on the jury's willingness
to convict in all jurisdictions.3"'
Changes in arrest, indictment, dismissal and conviction rates
showed no overall patterns.3 2 Rape reporting did increase to
some degree in all jurisdictions. The greatest increase was in
Michigan, where the strongest and most comprehensive reform was
enacted and where the changes were made all at once. Even in
Michigan, the pattern of reporting increases indicates that the
publicity surrounding enactment of the reforms was the precipi-
tating factor rather than the effects of the reforms on post-reform
prosecutions.3 3 However, other evidence indicated that, with the
exception of Michigan, most or all of the change in rape reporting
probably would have occurred even without the statutory reforms
because of the general influence of the women's movement, which
created greater awareness of the rape problem and "recognition of
the need for greater sensitivity in the treatment of victims of
rape.
,304
295. Id. at 100.
296. Id. at 113-15.
297. Id. at 115.
298. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122, at 95 (Pennsylvania).
299. Id. at 92-98 (all but Texas).
300. Id. at 115-16.
301. Id. at 116.
302. Id. at 67-74.
303. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122, at 101-02.
304. The authors conducted time series analyses that compared the dates of reform in
each jurisdiction with national trends. Id. at 80-86.
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The impact of the reforms on officials' evaluation of sexual
history evidence also failed to meet the reformers' expectations.
"Informal norms," or norms not dependent on the applicable
statutes, continued to have the largest influence on whether sexual
history evidence would be admissible at trial. The only real change
in the officials' evidentiary judgments concerned evidence that a
complainant had engaged in prior sex with men she met in singles'
bars. Judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers were convinced that
such evidence "should not and would not be allowed in court.
Many were adamant that such behavior was no one else's business
and, furthermore, was irrelevant to the issues in the case.
30 5
However, the same respondents tended to believe that other
evidence of prior sexual contact with men other than the accused
should or would be admitted in their jurisdictions, generally on the
basis of its probative weight."° The authors of the study suggest-
ed that most of the changes in attitudes about the admissibility of
prior sexual history evidence resulted from changes in general
societal attitudes. 3 7 Furthermore, even the strongest rape shield
laws retained significant judicial discretion. 318  The laws affect
only certain kinds of cases, which never included cases where the
complainant was previously acquainted with the accused. °9 In
addition, in acquaintance rape cases, corroboration and resistance
evidence was still considered essential for obtaining convictions
from juries, even where the statutes explicitly stated that such
evidence was not required.310 Consequently, victims of stranger
rapes appear to have been the primary beneficiaries of most of the
rape law reforms.3 '
Why weren't the reforms more effective? One key is the
degree of discretion that judges retain in deciding whether
particular evidence is relevant.312 The jury system is another key;
305. Id. at 153.
306. Id. at 153-54. The respondents apparently felt that such prior sexual contact
constituted inappropriate conduct.
307. Id. at 80, 154.
308. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122, at 164-65.
309. Id. at 166.
310. Id. at 159, 163. The authors noted that under statutes that do not require
corroboration or resistance evidence, it is still within the prosecutors' and judges' discretion
whether to give instructions to the jury on these points. Id. at 163.
311. Id. at 156, 163.
312. Id. at 164-65, 173. Spohn and Homey noted that official discretion tends to be
exercised so as to thwart victim-oriented law reforms like those of the 1970s rape reform
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juries can, in effect, mandate additional (and traditional) evidence
before they will convict an accused of an acquaintance rape.313
Another relevant factor is the ability of participants in the case-pro-
cessing system of some jurisdictions, where there is a large degree
of stability in the judges and lawyers who work together on rape
cases, to reach informal agreements about the extent to which the
law reforms would be implemented or thwarted.314 Finally, as
prior studies of criminal law reforms have found, the criminal
justice system is characterized by tremendous "adaptive behavior"
in law reform implementation. 315  A criminal law reform "that
contradicts deeply held beliefs may result either in open defiance
of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law.,
316
Given the disappointing results of the rape law reform effort
when measured against the hopes and expectations of the reform-
ers, was the effort worthwhile? Has feminist scholarship on rape
made a difference? Spohn and Horney conclude that the symbolic
message of the rape law reforms was important regardless of the
small amount of substantive impact. They note that several years
after the reforms, most of the criminal justice system participants
interviewed strongly supported the reforms. These participants also
believed the reforms "had resulted in more sensitive treatment of
xiictims of rape., 317 The latter improvement is a major reform in
and of itself.
In addition, even if the significant changes in rape reporting by
women and in sensitivity to rape complainants by most participants
in the legal system relate directly to general societal attitude shifts,
the role of legal scholarship and social science research in educating
the public cannot be discounted. Even if the general public does
movement. Such reforms "are unlikely to facilitate the smooth and efficient flow of cases
through the system, and are likely to conflict with officials' values concerning protection of
the rights of defendants." Id. at 173. This highlights the importance of the small number
of women judges. See supra notes 262-72 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
314. In jurisdictions where a small number of judges handle all rape trials and prosecutors
and/or legal aid lawyers are either assigned to handle all rape cases or to specific courtrooms,
such informal agreements develop almost as a matter of course. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra
note 122, at 66-67, 167-68.
315. Id. at 168 (citing Jonathan D. Casper & David Brereton, Evaluating Criminal Justice
Reforms, 18 L. & SOC'Y. REV. 121,123 (1984)). See also FEiLD & BIENEN, supra note 26,
at 205 n.142.
316. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122, at 167 (quoting R.T. NAKAMURA & F.
SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (St. Martin's Press 1980).
317. Id. at 175.
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not read law reviews and social science journals, they do read the
newspapers that report social science findings, pick up on newly
evolving attitudes of the bench and bar, and, at least sometimes,
listen to the jury instructions which have been reshaped as a result
of new research and analysis. In addition, when many women who
had been raped spoke out about the indignities and injustices of the
prereform justice system, legal analyses from the victims' and
reformers' viewpoint provided intellectual legitimacy for significant
case law reform that often preceded statutory change, and for
applying laws in a more balanced, less androcentric manner.
This review of rape law reform indicates that the exclusion of
women from political and social power in the centuries prior to and
after the seventeenth century has had deep and tenacious effects on
how society is structured and how individual members of that
society understand themselves and each other. Due to society's
exclusion of women from positions of power, one set of opinions
and values derived from a single perspective was believed to be the
whole "objective" truth about women and rape. In actuality, they
were only a range of opinions and values derived from one
perspective, that of being male and part of the dominant and
physically stronger group in society.
We have seen concretely that the attitudes of society thus
formed helped shape the definition of rape and influenced
significantly how general principles of evidence were applied to one
special class of trials. We have seen that some men, despite being
members of the dominant white male establishment, were able to
see aspects of the bias that had been built into the law of rape and
were moved to urge reform of the law. But even these men ap-
peared to find it difficult to shed their traditional male perspective
with respect to most aspects of the law they sought to reform.
We have seen that most ways in which the law of rape exhibits
a one-sidedly male perspective remained unidentified until women
began to examine the law and its consequences with the tools they
gained from increased access to legal education. Transforming those
new insights into reform of existing laws and practices in the legal
system required women to articulate their own point of view in
order for lobbying efforts to result in law reform. We also can
conjecture that the leadership, insights and energy of women newly
admitted to the legal community and the greater authority with
which women lawyers could speak to legislators and other voters
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were important components in achieving even the limited success
of their reform efforts."'
It is clear that the process of reform is not yet concluded and
must continue to depend on general education and political
319action. While new insights and suggestions are continuing to
appear in the scholarly literature, the immediate source of most
change will continue to be the revised frameworks which judges,
juries, prosecutors and police apply to rape prosecutions. The
contributions of scholars will remain important for their cumulative
effect on such actors.
IV. Conclusion: Implications for Other Legal Scholarship
This examination of rape law supports the claims of feminists
and critical race scholars that members of a dominant community
who are already part of the established legal community cannot
expect to understand, either automatically or solely through the
prism of their own experiences, the many ways their view of reality
is shaped and sometimes distorted by their own perspective.320
Members of a dominant community need to engage in dialogue
with non-dominant community members to see legal issues, as well
as other issues, from broader perspectives that are essential for
formulating a balanced view.
These questions are of growing importance in the United
States because they address core issues for every pluralist demo-
cratic society. They are intimately related both to the liberal
tradition, with its emphasis on individual self-realization of the
greatest numbers of people, and to the important civic republican
tradition, with its emphasis on the role of law and government in
318. MARSH ET AL., supra note 87, at 18-19.
319. A few scholars believe the statutes that bar use of prior sexual history evidence for
purposes of proving consent, e.g., "pattern of conduct" evidence, go too far. Many defense
lawyers claim their clients have been unfairly disadvantaged by the recent reforms.
However, those views are not widely shared among even male judges and prosecutors. Id.
at 79. Cf. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 122, at 155 (noting that the concerns of rape
shield law critics that relevant sexual conduct evidence would be excluded were largely
unfounded).
320. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Foreword, in GERALDINE R. SEGAL, BLACK IN THE
LAW xiv (1983). "[T]he long-term and persistent underrepresentation of blacks in the legal
system reflects in itself ... the absence of advocates who could identify most with the
problems of blacks when critical decisions were being made about the direction and destiny
of society." Id. at xiv.
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discovering and effectuating the common good and not merely the
best interests of the elite or dominant class.
321
Diversity of participants in all roles within the legal system is
essential before the system can evaluate the claimed objectivity or
neutrality of the value choices made by the traditionally dominant
or fully included segments of society.3 22 When the dominant
reality has been constructed without the participation or perspec-
tive of a group of directly affected people, those who are excluded
or disempowered may hold the key to some of the most important
aspects of the truth. That was true about slavery. It is true about
rape, even if neither major perspective neatly resolves the question
of how to take account of the whole reality while preserving the
most important values of our criminal justice system. Americans
will undoubtedly find that previously excluded Viewpoints furnish
important keys for understanding other areas of law as scholarship
broadens its scope.
The apparent or facial neutrality of a doctrine, rule or system
is no guarantee of neutrality. Nor are sincerely held goals of
fairness and justice. Many of the real questions simply never arise
until a diversity of perspectives becomes manifest. To provide
society with that diversity of perspectives, it is necessary to provide
each community within society with an opportunity to contribute
to the debate over time and in significant numbers.3" Only after
such an opportunity will society have any assurance that the legal
community may be taking account of all perspectives relevant to a
particular debate.
321. See Edward A. Gargan, Indian Myth Sharpens Reality of Religious Strife, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at 10 (noting that a professor of analytical philosophy at Lucknow
University in India reported that many Indians "feel that the nation's pluralism and secularist
principles are under siege" because the Hindu majority of the country is experiencing a
"terror psychosis that the Hindus might be eliminated and India might be declared an Islamic
raj" even though Muslims make up only 10 or 12 percent of the population).
322. Compare RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) and Kent
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978),
with BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) and Mary O'Brien
& Sheila McIntyre, Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education, 2 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 69,
74 (1986) ("the consensual state has as a condition of its success the need to present itself
as a just state, as well as to objectify the principle of justice in a visible legal system")
(emphasis in the original).
323. As we have seen, substantial time is required to effect legal reforms that relate to
unconscious assumptions in addition to explicit rules, as well as simply to assess the effects
of the reforms.
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In a democracy, so long as the legal institutions and the schol-
ars who think about them do not fairly reflect the composition of
the society with respect to any characteristic exerting a significant
impact on the lives of a community within, then diversity as a
qualification, however "merit-extraneous" in some contexts, must
become a positive qualification. Without such diversity, we will not
be able to share the diversity of viewpoints necessary to implement
our deepest democratic values.

